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Determinants of US Household Debt: New Evidence from the SCF 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the factors driving US household borrowing up to 2007. Two popular 
explanations are tested: First, the expenditure cascades hypothesis based on the assumption of debt-
financed expenditures driven by an increasingly polarised distribution of income (‘keeping up with the 
Joneses’) and second, the hypothesis of Minskyian households which identifies climbing real estate 
prices as the decisive factor in household debt accumulation (re-mortgaging in order to cash in on 
capital gains and rising loan-to-value ratios in property purchases). This paper develops a method for 
obtaining individual household borrowing figures despite the lack of a panel structure from the Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF); it is the first to use the high quality information the SCF provides to 
investigate the impact of shifts in the income distribution and asset prices on household borrowing. 
The findings indicate that it is the interaction between the concentration of income at the top of the 
distribution and rising real estate prices which explains a large fraction of the increase in household 
borrowing prior to 2008. Therefore, neither the expenditure cascades hypothesis nor the hypothesis 
of Minskyian households are, in isolation, sufficient in order to understand household debt 
accumulation and thus the paper calls for a synthesis: future research should analyse the role of the 
distribution of income and asset prices together rather than separately. 
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1 Introduction 
The financial crisis demonstrated the important role of debt and especially private sector debt for 
macroeconomic dynamics. Up to 2007 it was widely believed in neoclassical economics that money 
and credit are mere nominal phenomena and that fluctuations of real quantities such as GDP can be 
studied by abstracting from the nominal sphere of the economy. Since then the ‘credit cycle’ has 
attracted increasing attention in academic and policy debates. Empirical research carried out since the 
crisis showed that there is an important link between debt and macroeconomic fluctuations. Credit 
booms for example are a valuable predictor of financial crises (Schularick & Taylor 2012; Borio 2014; 
Eichengreen & Mitchener 2003) and expanding credit to the household sector and especially to low 
quality borrowers will eventually trigger mass defaults and adverse growth effects (Bezemer et al. 
2014; Mian & Sufi 2009) when asset prices start to decline1. 
While there is a consensus that private debt in general and household debt in particular has to be taken 
seriously in macroeconomic analysis, there is no consensus about the key drivers of credit booms. Most 
specifically, why do households decide to take on debt levels which they eventually fail to handle? The 
textbook version of the life-cycle consumer would use debt only to smooth consumption over her 
lifespan and never default on it. Thus explanations going beyond the standard consumption model are 
needed. This paper will investigate two popular explanations for why US households became heavily 
indebted prior to the financial crisis.  
The first focuses on increasing income inequality as a cause for household borrowing: in an 
environment of well above average income growth for the top tail of the distribution (see Figure A1 in 
the Appendix), those individuals who fall behind will take on debt in order to maintain spending levels.  
The maintenance of spending levels relative to higher income classes is important for lower class 
households because social status is to a great extent perceived through one’s expenditures (‘keeping 
up with the Joneses’). Beginning with relatively rich households which fall behind even richer peers, 
the process of status-driven debt accumulation cascades down the income distribution. The result is a 
heavily indebted and heavily spending household sector. Thus this so called expenditure cascades 
hypothesis provides a potential explanation of US household behaviour prior to the 2007 crisis. Frank 
(1985) and Frank et al. (2014) who trace this idea back to Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) were 
                                                          
1 The less sharp decline in property prices and less aggressive lending to low income households compared to 
the US are the two main reasons why the UK so far managed to cope with household debt levels well above 
100% of disposable income. 
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among the first to make that argument. Belabed et al. (2013), Kapeller and Schütz (2014), Kim (2013) 
and Ryoo and Kim (2014) are recent theoretical models of status driven debt accumulation.  
The second explanation of household indebtedness emphasizes the role of rising property prices and 
homeownership rates. Homeownership is the socially desirable norm in the US which is actively 
supported by policies such as the government-sponsored enterprises. Thus the dream of owning a 
house coupled with eased access to credit for low income borrowers due to financial deregulation 
boosted house prices and ownership rates in the 1990s and 2000s. While in 1989 63.9% of US 
households owned their primary residence, in 2004 already 69.1%2 did and house prices rose 115% 
during the same period3. With many US households already being owners, rising property prices 
resulted in substantial capital gains for a large part of the population. Increasingly optimistic 
households assumed the high and increasing property price level to be a permanent phenomenon and 
used (second) mortgages to ‘realize’ these gains. Furthermore, taking on larger mortgages relative to 
one’s income to buy a property became reasonable under the perception of increasing or at least 
permanently high property prices. The literature on wealth effects (Paiella 2009; Cooper & Dynan 
2014) in general and Mian & Sufi (2011) and Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) in particular provide 
empirical backing for this line of reasoning which will be labelled the Minskyian households hypothesis 
as rising asset prices over a long period of relative stability lead to an over-accumulation of liabilities4. 
With spectacular increases in US property prices and record levels of income inequality prior to the 
financial crisis, both hypotheses seem to be logically consistent with the rise in US household debt. 
This paper is the first to assess the explanatory power of both explanations in a unified framework. In 
order to do so the paper develops a method for deriving annual changes in household liabilities from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), despite that dataset’s lack of a panel structure. Having such a 
measure at hand makes the high quality information on households’ income and households’ balance 
sheets in the SCF useable for an econometric study of the determinants of household borrowing.  
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways: first, deriving individual annual household 
borrowing from the repeated cross section data of the SCF allows the author to investigate the 
                                                          
2 Calculations based on the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
3 The S&P / Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index stood at 73.62 in January 1989 and at 158.67 in 
December 2004 (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CSUSHPINSA).   
4 Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky 1978) explains financial crises as the result of unsustainable 
debt accumulation in the corporate sector due to increasing asset prices and a period of relative tranquillity 
which breeds instability by encouraging overly optimistic and risky behaviour. The term ‘Minskyian households’ 
reflects this idea that rising asset prices provide the necessary collateral and confidence for economic actors to 
accumulate debt up to unsustainable levels but applies it to the household sector instead of the corporate 
sector as in Minsky’s original work.  
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accumulation of household debt based on the best available survey data on household finances. The 
unmatched advantage of the SCF compared to other US household surveys is that it relies on tax 
information in order to adequately capture the top tail of the income and wealth distribution and thus 
is the only survey which deals in a convincing way with non-observation and differential non-response 
problems (a more detailed discussion is provided in section 3.1). In addition the SCF provides the most 
detailed breakdown of the household balance sheet among available surveys and since existing 
liabilities and assets are crucial in determining current borrowing, not having this kind of information 
most likely yields biased results. Second, the paper brings together two powerful explanations of US 
household borrowing by assessing the impact of income inequality and rising property prices in a 
unified model. Doing so not only avoids potentially serious omitted variable problems but also allows 
a direct comparison of the effect size of both hypotheses. Thus the paper goes beyond simply reporting 
the statistical significance of the estimated effects. Third, the paper is the first to separately analyse 
the groups of borrowing and non-borrowing households. Fundamentally different results for the two 
groups demonstrate that borrowing and debt repayment decisions are not symmetric. Thus separating 
them in the analysis yields a better description of household behaviour which is reflected in an 
improved model fit. 
Based on the newly developed measure of household borrowing the paper finds evidence supporting 
the expenditure cascades hypothesis conditional on homeownership. This means that households are 
only able to engage in status driven debt-financed expenditures if they have access to collateral. 
Households borrowed $963 billion5 more in 2004 compared to 1995 due to the increase in residential 
real estate prices and the rise of top incomes. In addition the paper also finds that rising real estate 
prices strongly contributed to household indebtedness via home purchases: households borrowed 
$584 billion more in 2004 compared to 1995 due to rising costs of purchases. These findings 
demonstrate that, individually, neither the expenditure cascades hypothesis nor the hypothesis of 
Minskyian households are sufficient to explain household debt accumulation prior to 2007. Instead a 
unified approach is needed which allows for both mechanisms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the related literature, section 3 
introduces the data and develops the method used to compute the change in household liabilities from 
the cross sectional dataset. Section 4 presents the econometric model as well as the definitions of 
                                                          
5 Expressed in 2013 prices. 
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reference groups. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 reports aggregate level effect 
size computations and the final section concludes. 
2 Determinants of Household Borrowing 
This section reviews the literature on the expenditure cascades hypothesis and the hypothesis of 
Minskyian households as explanations for rising household indebtedness. The starting point and point 
of reference is the life-cycle model of consumption which suggests that households borrow in order to 
smooth out life-time consumption as a reaction to transitory income and wealth shocks (Romer, 2012; 
Attanasio and Weber, 2010). As the goal of this paper is to explain the sustained increase in household 
debt-to-income ratios since the early 1990s, transitory shocks cannot be a valid explanation because 
borrowing as a reaction would only be transitory as well. In contrast permanent income shocks in a 
life-cycle model of consumption imply permanent changes of consumption but do not affect 
borrowing. A permanent reduction in income will result in lower consumption expenditures as rational 
households would not take on debt as a substitute for income because higher debt levels would reduce 
future consumption or violate the budget constraint and thus the assumption of no default. Permanent 
shocks to wealth and most importantly housing wealth in contrast, can have a lasting effect on 
borrowing behaviour. If households were to consume some part of their real estate capital gains they 
would have to either sell the entire property or, more conveniently, take on an additional mortgage. 
Two important implications arise: First, the life-cycle model relies on rational consumers which are 
able to distinguish between transitory and permanent changes to income and wealth. Second, even 
permanent changes to income or wealth should only lead to small changes in consumption or 
borrowing because these gains are consumed over the entire life-time of the household6. If the simple 
model outlined so far is extended by introducing credit constraints, constrained households would 
react to permanent increases of their housing assets by additional borrowing. These effects would be 
large even with long optimization horizons. Thus the life-cycle model predicts ‘pure’ wealth effects to 
be small due to long optimization horizons whereas wealth effects due to credit constraints might 
result in large changes of household consumption and borrowing. In contrast to permanent income 
changes, a change in the distribution of income has no impact on aggregate spending or borrowing 
because agents are assumed to be homogeneous in their preferences. 
With the collapse of the US housing market beginning in 2006 and the following financial crisis the 
Post-Keynesian economist Hyman P. Minsky and his Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1978) 
                                                          
6 However as Carroll (2001) points out assuming (realistic) planning or optimizing horizons of two to three years 
instead of two to three decades, results in much larger current effects of permanent changes. 
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have attracted renewed interest. The powerful notion that periods of stability breed instability by 
encouraging riskier financial practices was briefly recognized as a theory able to explain major crises 
in contrast to standard New-Keynesian or Real Business Cycle models. Minsky’s work is relevant in the 
context of household debt accumulation because it provides an explanation of why agents take on too 
much debt and eventually default. However Minsky’s focus in his own work was on the behaviour of 
corporations and most of the literature trying to formalize the Financial Instability Hypothesis only 
includes corporate debt in their models 7 . Ryoo (2015) is currently the only paper which applies 
Minsky’s ideas to the household sector and develops a model of endogenous instability8: Households 
borrow in order to finance additional consumption and housing expenditures. Increasing housing 
demand leads to capital gains which feeds back into additional borrowing due to the improved balance 
sheet position of households. The result is a prolonged boom followed by a severe recession. The key 
point is that even if house price appreciations are driven by a growing debt-load and thus cannot be 
permanent, they encourage household borrowing. Thus a Minskyian model of the household sector 
does not depend on the questionable distinction between transitory and permanent shocks but 
predicts positive wealth effects on consumption and offers a powerful tool for understanding 
households’ debt accumulation prior to 2007. 
Beyond the Financial Instability Hypothesis, Post-Keynesian economic theory provides another 
rationale for the role of asset prices in household borrowing. The tradition of stock-flow-consistent 
(SFC) modelling, going back to Tobin (1969, 1982) and pioneered by Godley and Lavoie (2007) 
emphasizes the importance of connecting all flows in an economic model to corresponding stocks at 
the end of the period. An important feature of these models is that economic actors are anchored by 
so-called stock-flow norms (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p.75). In the case of households this means they 
form consumption decisions in line with achieving a desired net-wealth-to-income ratio. These desired 
wealth-to-income ratios reflect propensities to save and consume out of disposable income and net-
wealth respectively and thus are influenced by precautionary saving motives as well as social norms. 
An increase in (real estate) wealth will lead to a reduction in household savings if the target wealth-to-
income ratio is not yet reached and to dissaving in the form of taking on additional debt if the target 
                                                          
7 For recent examples of corporate Minsky models see Bhattacharya et al. (2015), Keen (2013), Charles (2008), 
Dos Santos (2005)  and the references therein. 
8 Kapeller and Schütz (2014) and Ryoo and Kim (2014) also adopt Minskyian ideas to the household sector but 
combined that with the expenditure cascades hypothesis and thus these authors are discussed in the next 
subsection. 
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is surpassed. On the individual level this prediction translates into positive wealth effects for asset 
holders and negative wealth effects for non-holders.  
With respect to the distribution of income Post-Keynesian economic theory assumes different 
propensities to consume across the income distribution due to empirically higher saving rates towards 
the top of the distribution (Dynan et al., 2004). In models without a personal distribution of income a 
higher propensity to consume out of wages than out of profits is assumed. These assumptions imply 
that a relative increase of top or profit incomes will lead to a decrease in aggregate consumption 
spending (Hein and Vogel, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011). A priori it is not clear whether such a 
redistribution would also increase household borrowing. It would do so if households want to sustain 
past consumption levels and are not liquidity constrained.  
A recent paper emphasizes the importance of the relative position within the income distribution for 
household spending and borrowing decisions (Frank et al., 2014). Tracing that idea back to Veblen 
(1899) and Duesenberry (1949), Frank (1985) and Frank et al. (2014) argue that consumption is not 
only about satisfying one’s needs but also about signalling and demonstrating social status (‘keeping 
up with the Joneses’). They use that argument to explain household indebtedness: If status comparison 
manifests in an upward looking manner, rising income inequality will trigger a debt-financed 
consumption spree which cascades down the income distribution. The intuition is that households 
which experience slower income growth relative to their peers at the top of the distribution will start 
to borrow in order to keep up with the lifestyle of their peers.  Since also debt-financed expenditures 
are relevant for status signalling, the process of borrowing in order to keep up with a life style of richer 
peers cascades down the income distribution. The pioneering data work of Atkinson, Piketty and co-
authors (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014), revealing the sharp rise in income inequality over the 
last decades, contributed to the popularity of this idea and resulted in a number of papers which 
develop it in formal theoretical models (Belabed et al., 2013; Kapeller and Schütz, 2014; Ryoo and Kim, 
2014; Cardaci, 2014; Nikiforos, 2015). 
The empirical literature which seeks to quantify consumption wealth effects largely confirms the 
existence of such wealth effects (Lehnert, 2004; Bostic et al., 2009; Cooper, 2012; Salotti, 2012; Juster 
et al., 2005; Dynan, 2010). However since consumption wealth effects only provide indirect evidence 
for the hypothesis that house price appreciations drive household debt trends, this literature is not 
discussed here and interested readers are referred to the recent surveys by Cooper and Dynan (2014) 
and Paiella (2009). All studies which directly assess the impact of asset prices on household borrowing 
report a positive direct relationship. Hurst and Stafford (2004) for example use PSID data and find that 
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liquidity constrained households are more likely to refinance their mortgage and extract equity 
compared to unconstrained households. Even though Hurst and Stafford (2004) focus on equity 
extraction as a reaction to transitory shocks they provide some evidence that house price appreciations 
are a potential factor which drives up household borrowing due to equity extraction. Haurin and 
Rosenthal (2006) are interested in the extent to which home equity extraction can explain consumer 
spending. Their regression of housing capital gains and other controls on household debt yields a 
positive and statistically positive effect based on data from the SCF and the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth. Dynan and Kohn (2007) have access to the unpublished version of the SCF and argue 
that house price appreciation was a major reason for rising household indebtedness. Finally Mian and 
Sufi (2011) analyse the variation across metropolitan statistical areas in household debt growth for 
homeowners between 2002 and 2006. They demonstrate that house prices matter for household 
borrowing independent of any potentially omitted third factors such as productivity.  
There are several authors relying on aggregate data to test the expenditure cascades hypothesis 
(Cynamon and Fazzari, 2015; Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2015; Behringer and Treeck, 2013) yielding 
mixed results. Since this paper relies on survey data this review focusses on the much richer literature 
which uses micro data to investigate the role of the relative position of an individual with respect to 
its peers. A closer look at this literature reveals a striking degree of heterogeneity in the way reference 
groups are defined. In contrast to upward looking status comparison as required by the expenditure 
cascades hypothesis, many authors define peer groups based on household characteristics such as age 
and education (Maurer and Meier, 2008), the region the household lives in (Ravina, 2007), or just 
compare different categories of consumption goods (Heffetz, 2011). All of these studies do find 
evidence of (at least) modest positive effects of peer group consumption on household spending. Two 
recent studies explicitly adopt upward looking preferences and thus are important reference points 
for this paper. Bertrand and Morse (2013) model consumption for the bottom 80% of households 
depending not only on individual characteristics such as income or age but also on the consumption of 
the average household in the 80th percentile of the income distribution. Income percentiles are 
computed for each US State. Using data form the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from 1980 to 
2008 they find a positive effect of consumption expenditures of rich households on lower income 
households and interpret these findings as evidence in favour of the expenditure cascades hypothesis. 
Carr and Jayadev (2014) model the relative position of the individual household in more detail. They 
use a measure of relative income defined as the proportion of households which are richer than 
household i. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1999 to 2009 Carr and 
Jayadev (2014) find positive and statistically significant effects of their relative income measure on 
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household borrowing growth and interpreted it as evidence in line with the expenditure cascades 
hypothesis.  
Overall the empirical evidence seems to strongly support the hypothesis of Minskyian households and 
the importance of asset price dynamics for household borrowing while evidence for the expenditure 
cascades hypothesis is more mixed. With respect to the latter studies relying on aggregate data are 
not conclusive about the existence (Behringer & Treeck 2013; Perugini et al. 2015) or non-existence 
(Bordo & Meissner 2012; Stockhammer & Wildauer 2015) of a positive link between income inequality 
and (household) borrowing. Furthermore as pointed out by Bertrand and Morse (2013) the existence 
of a positive link between relative income and household debt is not sufficient for demonstrating that 
the expenditure cascades hypothesis is able to explain a major proportion of the increase in household 
debt prior to 2007. Bertrand and Morse (2013) report that based on their results the increase in income 
inequality from the 1980s onward only explains 1.3 percentage points of the fall in the NIPA savings 
rate and thus by far is not enough to be regarded as the main cause for increased household 
indebtedness. In addition despite strong evidence for the important role housing wealth plays for 
household spending and borrowing decisions, the studies seeking to test the expenditure cascades 
hypothesis as an explanation for rising household debt, generally ignore the role of assets. Another 
issue with survey based papers is that both Bertrand and Morse (2013) as well as Carr and Jayadev 
(2014) use data which only provides limited detail about the top of the income distribution. In 
particular there is no study on the expenditure cascades hypothesis using the SCF. This is an important 
drawback of existing studies since income inequality in the US rose due to strongly growing top 
incomes and thus not including those top households in one’s sample will yield misleading results.  The 
next section elaborates on that latter point by discussing the specific advantages of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances provides for studying the links between household borrowing, asset prices and the 
distribution of income. 
3 Data: The Survey of Consumer Finances 
3.1 The SCF and Non-Observation and Non-Response Bias in Surveys 
The paper relies on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances between 1995 and 2007. The SCF is a 
triannual survey undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in cooperation with the Statistics of 
Income Division (SOI) of the Internal Revenue Service. In each wave between 4,299 (1995) and 4,519 
(2004) observations are included. The SCF focuses on household income, assets and liabilities and 
represents the most detailed source of information about household balance sheets and especially 
 
9 
 
 
high income household balance sheets. This latter benefit of the SCF stems from the dual-frame sample 
design consisting of an area-probability sample and a list sample.  
About two thirds of the completed cases stem from the area probability sample which is built in three 
stages. In the first stage metropolitan areas and rural counties are stratified by a variety of 
characteristics and primary sampling units (PSUs) are selected proportional to their population. At the 
second stage subareas are selected within PSUs again based on stratification. At the third stage random 
samples are drawn within these subgroups. This design ensures that each household in the sample has 
the same probability of being selected. Thus the area-probability sample covers broadly distributed 
household characteristics, while at the same time limiting the cost of data collection due to the 
stratified design.  
Nevertheless there are two important shortcomings. First, due to the highly skewed distribution of 
household characteristics like income and wealth an enormous sample size would be needed to gain 
sufficient observations of wealthy households to obtain an adequate picture of the distribution of 
these characteristics. The cost of obtaining such a sample would be substantial. For example the 
relatively large Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is based on less than 14,000 observations 
representing 124 million households in 2012. This corresponds to a sample of only 0.11‰ of the target 
population. Even a large survey like the CEX is not sufficient to adequately represent the highly skewed 
income distribution because there are not enough observations from the top end of the distribution 
part of the sample. This fact becomes obvious if one compares the average pre-tax income in the 10th 
decile calculated from CEX data with data published by the IRS. According to the IRS, average income 
in the top decile in 2011 was $2.1 million9 compared to $229,77110 in 2014 according to CEX data. So 
despite the timing gap and different income concepts the difference is striking. This is the problem of 
non-observation also demonstrated by simulation exercises in Kennickell (2005) and Eckerstorfer et al. 
(2015).  
Second, there is evidence that the likelihood of participation in (wealth) surveys is negatively 
correlated with household wealth itself (Kennickell & McManus 1993; Singer 2006; Kennickell 2008) 
known as systematic non-response. One can think of several reasons why rich households are less 
willing to participate, ranging from greater concerns about data protection to higher valuation of the 
time needed to complete the interview. However if non-response is systematically related to 
                                                          
9 IRS data based on “1979 Income Concept” from SOI Bulletin article - Individual Income Tax Rates and Tax 
Shares, Table 7. 
10 Summary Table 1110 (http://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/combined/decile.pdf).  
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household characteristics like wealth or income, any estimates based on samples which do not address 
this problem will be biased. 
In order to deal with these two problems, the SCF relies on the second component of the dual-frame 
sample: the list sample. The purpose of the list component is to over-sample wealthy households. In 
order to be able to identify such households prior to data collection an external data source is needed. 
Due to a cooperation under extremely strict privacy conditions, the list sample is built by using a sample 
of income tax records. Based on that information the assets of tax units are estimated by capitalizing 
asset related income streams11. Then observations are selected in a two stage process. First, only 
observations in PSUs which were already selected for the area-probability sample are considered in 
order to keep the costs of the survey in check. Second, households are stratified based on percentiles 
of the estimated asset holdings (SCF documents refer to it as a wealth index). Then samples are drawn 
from each strata and strata corresponding to higher estimated net wealth are sampled at higher rates. 
The details about the sample design of the list sample are not publicly available in order to ensure 
anonymity of all participants.  
Due to non-observation and non-response problems, surveys which do not pay as much attention to 
their sample design as the SCF does and in particular surveys which do not apply oversampling 
techniques suffer from serious shortcomings and are in general not able to provide an adequate 
picture of the income or wealth distribution. Kennickell (2008) demonstrates the contribution of the 
list sample for the SCF: While net worth at the 90th percentile only increases by 5.5% due to the 
additional information from the list sample, at the 99th percentile the increase is 74%. Vermeulen 
(2014) and Eckerstorfer et al. (2015) demonstrate the impact of such a shortcoming for other countries 
and surveys. The latter paper estimates that aggregate net wealth is underestimated by about one 
quarter due to non-observation and non-response problems in the case of Austria in the Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey. Since the current paper investigates the expenditure cascades 
hypothesis which crucially relies on strong top income growth, taking non-observation and non-
response problems seriously is important. By using income tax information, the SCF deals with both 
issues in a convincing way and thus should be the first choice when investigating phenomena related 
to the distribution of income.  
Like any household survey the SCF faces the problem that participants are unable or unwilling to 
answer some of the questions. Leaving these missing values as they are would only allow complete 
                                                          
11 Kennickell (2000) provides a detailed discussion of the details and the two different models used.  
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case analysis at the cost of losing a considerable amount of information. Instead the SCF imputes 
missing values based on statistical modelling, referred to as multiple imputation (Rubin 1987; 
Kennickell 1998). In order to reflect the uncertainty associated with statistical modelling of missing 
information the process is repeated 5 times, yielding 5 separate datasets, so called implicates. Working 
with SCF data requires to analyse each dataset and then combine the results based on Rubin’s rules 
which in the simplest form state that point estimates should be averaged and in order to obtain proper 
standard errors for these estimates one has to take into account the variation within implicates as well 
as between implicates. 
3.2 The Problem of the Missing Time Dimension in the SCF 
A key limitation when using the SCF in econometric analysis is the missing time dimension of the 
dataset due to its design as a repeated cross section. Unlike with a panel one cannot follow the same 
household through time. However the detailed information the survey collects about the credit history 
of each participant allows to infer by how much the outstanding liabilities changed within the year of 
the survey. Thus one can infer whether an individual household took on debt in the year of the survey, 
paid back already existing liabilities or pursued neither of these activities. Creating such a measure is 
key for answering the question whether households which are exposed to rich peers take on debt in 
order to keep up in spending with these peers. Without knowing whether and by how much 
households take on debt in a given year one would have to rely on the total amount of outstanding 
liabilities. The stock of debt however is strongly influenced by past decisions, most importantly real 
estate purchases, and thus is not a good measure of whether households which are currently exposed 
to richer peers take on debt. This section presents the steps involved in creating a measure of the 
within year change in household liabilities. 
In order to understand how the change of an individual household’s debt level is constructed one has 
to keep in mind that the SCF covers 10 different debt categories. Participating households are asked 
about their outstanding liabilities with respect to mortgages (primary residence as well as other 
properties), lines of credit, credit on land contracts, consumer loans, credit cards, car and vehicle loans, 
education loans, loans against pension plans and other loans. Based on the specific information the 
survey collects about all these categories, the paper is able to construct a measure of how much that 
liability changed within the last year. For four categories there is not enough information to make such 
an inference: credit card debt, credit lines, loans against land contracts and loans against pension 
plans. For each household the changes in each category are summed up to obtain the total change in 
household 𝑖’s level of debt.  
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An example will be the best way to demonstrate how it was done. Let’s consider the outstanding 
amount on the first mortgage on the primary residence for household 𝑖, which will be denoted 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1. 
In order to understand by how much the outstanding amount changed, households are characterised 
in two steps. The first step distinguishes whether the mortgage was taken out in the current year (𝑡𝐵 =
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) or prior to the year of the interview (𝑡𝐵 < 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) and how the money was used (𝑢𝑠𝑒). The use 
of the money is summarized in four categories: refinancing an earlier mortgage (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑓), extract 
equity from the property ( 𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟 ), extract equity and refinance ( 𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟 + 𝑟𝑒𝑓 ) and 
mortgage taken out with no prior loan (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 0). 
In case the mortgage was taken out in the year of the interview (𝑡𝐵 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) the information on the 
use of the loan becomes crucial. If the mortgage was used to refinance an earlier credit (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑓, 
case 1), the change of that mortgage is defined as the difference between the amount currently 
outstanding (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1) and the amount initially borrowed (𝐵𝑖
𝑀1): ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 − 𝐵𝑖
𝑀1. The rationale for 
this definition is that the amount initially borrowed does not constitute a new liability but replaced an 
already existing one. Thus within this year only the difference between the refinanced amount and the 
currently outstanding amount represents an actual change in outstanding liabilities. It is important to 
note that depending on whether the amount initially borrowed is smaller, bigger or equal compared 
to the amount currently outstanding, the resulting change will be positive, negative or zero. The case 
of 𝐵𝑖
𝑀1 < 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 is interpreted as household 𝑖 being behind on payments and accumulating overdue 
interest which is added to the total amount due and thus the currently outstanding amount exceeds 
the amount initially borrowed.  
In contrast if the mortgage was used to extract equity from the residence (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟, case 2), the 
change in the amount outstanding is defined as the amount extracted (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 ): ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  which 
represents newly accumulated debt. If the mortgage was taken out to extract equity and to refinance 
an earlier loan (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟 + 𝑟𝑒𝑓, case 3) the change is defined as the amount extracted plus the 
difference between the amount currently outstanding and the amount initially borrowed: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 =
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 − 𝐵𝑖
𝑀1 . The difference between the current amount and the initial amount is added 
because this difference represents the extent to which (new as well as already existing) debt was paid 
down. If the household had no prior loan or mortgage (𝑢𝑠𝑒 = 0, case 4) the change in debt is simply 
defined as the amount currently outstanding because the amount currently outstanding represents 
debt accumulated in the current period: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1. The reasoning is that in this case 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀1 = 0 
and thus the change in debt equals the amount currently outstanding.  
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In most cases however the households did not take out their mortgage in the year of the interview 
(𝑡𝐵 < 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟). Thus for these households the task is to infer the amounts of principal repayment. In a 
second step households are distinguished based on whether the initial amount borrowed (𝐵𝑖
𝑀1) is 
bigger, equal or smaller than the amount currently outstanding (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1). In case the amount initially 
borrowed is bigger than the amount currently outstanding (𝐵𝑖
𝑀1 > 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1, case 5.1) it is assumed that 
these households are paying back their mortgage on schedule. Thus the change in debt equals the 
amount of principal repaid 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1. Principal repayment is computed as the difference between the total 
regular or typical annual payment the household makes and the implicit interest payments based on 
the reported interest rate for the loan and the currently outstanding amount. Thus in some cases 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 
might be negative which corresponds to a situation in which actual payments are less than the interest 
due. This means that unpaid interest accumulates and increases the outstanding amount and thus the 
principal ‘repayment’ is negative. In both cases the change in the outstanding liability is defined as the 
negative principal repayment ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = −𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1.  
If the amount initially borrowed and currently outstanding are equal (𝐵𝑖
𝑀1 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 , case 5.2) it is 
interpreted as the household being in a period of no principal repayment as part of an interest-only 
agreement. The household only pays interest but no principal for a certain period at the beginning of 
the contract. Thus the outstanding amount on that mortgage did not change in the year of the 
interview: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = 0 . Households which report an amount currently outstanding larger than the 
amount initially borrowed (𝐵𝑖
𝑀1 < 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1, case 5.3) are assumed to have fallen behind in payments. Due 
to the accumulated not paid interest the outstanding balance increased and now exceeds the amount 
initially borrowed. Only a few households report such a constellation, as expected. It is important to 
note that also households falling into case 5.1 can be behind on payments. In that case however they 
underwent an earlier period of repayment and struggled with payments only for a relatively short 
period such that accumulated interest does not exceed earlier repayments. The change in the 
mortgage balance for households falling into case 5.3 is also defined as the negative principal 
repayment: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 = −𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1. In almost all cases households in this category are paying back principal 
indicating that they are back on some payment plan. This seems convincing because it is unlikely that 
a lender will tolerate accumulated unpaid interest and the household still being behind in payments. 
One expects a lender in such a situation to seek control of the house and recover the lent money. Case 
5.3 is also compatible however with reverse mortgage where, especially elderly borrowers, take out a 
mortgage to finance retirement expenses and pay back the entire mortgage and all accrued interest 
after the property is sold after their death. Also negative amortization (negAM) contracts under which 
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neither principal nor interest payments are made for a short period, normally not more than 5 years, 
at the beginning of the mortgage contract are consistent with a payment pattern of case 5.3. All cases 
are summarized in Table 1 which also indicates the number of observations falling into each case in 
the 2004 wave in the third implicate. 1,984 out of 4,519 households reported an outstanding first 
mortgage on the primary residence in 2004 (implicate 3). 1,466 of these fell into case 5.1 and thus form 
the biggest group. The overwhelming majority of households in this group (1,431) is paying down debt. 
Thus even if at the aggregate level household debt increases, it is only a small portion of households 
which actually take on debt in a given year. While this is not a surprising result one has to keep it in 
mind for econometric modelling.  
The categorization of households along the two steps is visualized in Figure A2 in the Appendix. By 
applying a similar logic as in this example to six more debt categories (second and third mortgages on 
the primary residence, mortgages on other residential property, consumer loans, car and vehicle loans, 
education loans, other loans for property purchase and home improvements), the paper constructs a 
measure of the total change in household 𝑖’s liabilities (∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 ) by summing up the changes of the 
individual categories:  
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝐿 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑉𝐿 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝐿 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝐿   (1) 
where ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀  is the change in all outstanding mortgages on the primary residence (first, second and 
third: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 = ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀2 + ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀3 ), ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀  is the change in outstanding mortgages on other 
residential properties, ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝐿  is the change in outstanding unsecured consumer loans, ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑉𝐿  is the 
change in outstanding car and vehicle loans, ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝐿 is the change in outstanding education loans and 
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝐿 is the change in other outstanding liabilities. The definitions and the steps undertaken to define 
the change in outstanding liabilities for these other categories can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 1: Changes in the outstanding amount of the first mortgage on the primary residence 
case step 1  step 2 definition N interpretation 
1 
 tB=year ᴧ use = 
ref 
  
 ΔDM1 = D-B 168 
Mortgage taken out to 
refinance.   
2 
 tB=year ᴧ use = 
extr 
   ΔDM1 = ex 19 
Mortgage agreement altered to 
extract equity. 
3 
 tB=year ᴧ use = 
extr+ref 
   ΔDM1 = ex+D-B 39 
Equity extracting and 
refinancing. 
4  tB=year ᴧ use = 0    ΔDM1 = D 109 
No prior loan thus new debt. 
5.1  tB<year B > D  ΔDM1 = -P 1,466 
Household is repaying. 
5.2  tB<year B = D  ΔDM1 = 0 164 
No repayment yet. Probably 
interest only period. 
5.3  tB<year B < D  ΔDM1 = -P 19 
Fallen behind payment schedule 
and interest accumulated. 
        1,984   
tB corresponds to X802, use to X7137, ex to X7138, B to X804, D to X805 and P is defined as P=X808-
(X816/10000*X805) where X808 are transformed to annual payments and X813 is used if X808 is 
not reported. Observations falling into cases 3 and 4 are dropped prior to 2004 because ex is not 
observed.  
 
3.3 The SCF compared to other US Data Sets 
The raw dataset covers the years 1995 to 2007 in three year intervals and consists of 21,982 
observations. Since the SCF is a multiple imputed dataset with 5 imputations the total number of 
observations in the raw dataset is 109,910. Observations with zero income are dropped (810) as well 
as observations with a negative beginning of period debt level (2,460). The SCF does not provide 
information on how much additional money was borrowed on the first mortgage on the primary 
residence in case of equity withdrawals in the surveys prior to 2004. Thus in 1995, 1998 and 2001 a 
total of 748 households are excluded, falling into that category12. In addition 294 observations which 
exhibit change-in-debt-to-income ratios below -250% and above 500% are excluded from estimation. 
This leaves a final sample of 102,958 observations corresponding to roughly 20,592 observations per 
implicate. Sample sizes reported in regression tables refer to the number of observations per implicate. 
The fact that the SCF is seldom used for econometric modelling justifies to briefly point out the most 
important differences compared to other US household surveys notably the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). First, the SCF and CEX are repeated cross 
                                                          
12 Households which extract home equity but do not have a mortgage prior to the equity extraction are still 
part of the sample. 
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sections13. While the CEX re-interviews households within the year, the SCF in general does not 
interview the same households twice except in 2009 when the 2007 sample was re-interviewed. In 
addition the SCF collects data in a three year interval while the CEX does so at quarterly and weekly 
intervals. In contrast the PSID is a panel which started in 1968 collecting annual information until 1997 
and from 1999 on interviewing households every other year. The PSID was initially designed to study 
the dynamics of income and poverty and thus started out by oversampling low income families. While 
the SCF and CEX rely on new samples on an annual and triannual basis, the PSID sample only changes 
due to births, deaths, marriage occurring in the families originally sampled in 1968 and attrition which 
means households stop to participate. In 1997 a major sample adjustment took place in order to 
represent migration to the US. Second, the SCF focusses on income, assets and liabilities but contains 
almost no information on expenditures. In contrast the CEX focusses heavily on expenditures while the 
PSID focusses on low-income, poverty and health. It becomes clear that all three data sources were 
designed for very different purposes.  
Based on this brief comparison of three major US household surveys four key advantages of the SCF 
are identified. First, using tax information to oversample wealthy households provides detailed 
information about the top tail of the income and wealth distribution. Second, by not going into detail 
about household expenditures the SCF is able to provide detailed information about households’ 
balance sheets. Even though the CEX and PSID also collect information on assets and liabilities the SCF 
does it in a much more detailed way. Third, using a new sample for each wave minimizes the problem 
of attrition. Panel studies in general face the problem that if households drop out of the sample in a 
non-random way, the sample becomes unrepresentative over time. By drawing a new sample for each 
wave, repeated cross sections avoid this problem. Fourth, closely related to the previous point, by 
drawing new samples for each wave the SCF remains representative of the US population. While panel 
data sets can rely on non-sample information and adjust weights in order to correct for changes in the 
underlying population, repeated cross sections actually collect information which represents these 
changes. 
These highly attractive features of the SCF come at a cost however. At least two disadvantages are 
obvious. The first and most important drawback of the SCF is the low frequency at which data is 
collected. Three year intervals are long periods of time and by definition the SCF only provides limited 
information about what is going on in between. It is unthinkable of only having reliable information 
about inflation or GDP growth every three years. Second, the design as repeated cross section prohibits 
                                                          
13 Technically the CEX is a rotating panel but it follows households only over 5 quarters. 
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researchers from using panel data methods. Thus SCF data does not allow to control for (time-
invariant) heterogeneity and also the dynamics of the household balance sheet cannot be studied in 
full detail at the individual level. With respect to the last issue, this paper however demonstrates that 
by using the rich information the SCF provides about the timing of borrowing decision that this problem 
can be solved at least partially. Third, the SCF does not contain information on household expenditures 
which would be necessary in order to investigate consumption wealth effects. Due to its focus on 
income and the household balance sheet however this seems to be a fundamental constraint due to 
the limited amount of time interviewers have when collecting information. 
Despite these drawbacks, when it comes to studying household indebtedness and income inequality 
the SCF’s advantages outweigh its limitations. Much better coverage of the upper tail of the income 
and wealth distribution and much more detailed information on household assets and liabilities 
compared to other household surveys are strong reasons to rely on the SCF for such a research 
question.  
4 Estimating a Household-Debt-Accumulation-Function 
The specification of a reduced form household borrowing equation relies on the predictions from 
economic theory discussed in section 2. Most importantly the variable of interest is the annual change 
in total outstanding liabilities (∆𝐷𝑖𝑡) and not the total stock of debt (𝐷𝑖𝑡). The simple reason is that only 
the change is directly related to the flows of the current period whereas the stock depends on past 
decisions which are not observed. The change in liabilities is scaled by current household income (𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
in order to obtain a measure of borrowing which is comparable across the population. In contrast using 
the growth rate of outstanding liabilities looks appealing at first but debt growth rates are not useful 
indicators of household debt accumulation. Taking out new debt with very little outstanding liabilities 
results in misleadingly large growth rates even if the actual amount of new debt is quite small in 
absolute terms or relative to household income. Beyond that growth rates are not defined for 
households with no prior liabilities and using a log approximation is highly problematic because it does 
not work well for large rates14. In addition the amount of already existing liabilities is not a particularly 
relevant criterion in order to assess the extent of a household’s indebtedness. Instead income 
represents the flow out of which the household has to repay principal and interest and thus yields a 
                                                          
14 These are specific problems of household data. Aggregate data at the state or county level are less prone to 
these issues because the outstanding debt stock within the county or State most likely will be well above 0 and 
thus growth rates will yield an indicator of household borrowing which is comparable across counties or States. 
However in case of a high degree of heterogeneity in income dynamics, also growth rates at the aggregate level 
might be a misleading indicator.  
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more informative benchmark. This paper also refuses to use assets to scale household liabilities 
because asset prices tend to be volatile and in boom phases increase in line with liabilities exposing 
high leverage only after asset prices collapse. For all these reasons income is used to scale household 
borrowing. The exact definitions of all variables used, in line with the notation of the official 
documentation of the SCF, can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
When thinking about determinants of household debt dynamics the first category to consider is 
household income for obvious reasons: income is the main source of funding for most expenditures 
especially for consumption expenditures and thus influences to what extent borrowing is needed to 
achieve desired spending levels. Economic theory however differs about the impact of income on 
household borrowing. While the life-cycle model predicts that households borrow in order to smooth 
consumption, the implication of cross-section income variation is not immediately clear. If high-income 
households are more exposed to more regular but smaller shocks relative to their income like 
temporary declines in stock markets whereas low-income households face larger shocks relative to 
income like unemployment, one would expect a negative cross section effect of income on the 
household borrowing to income ratio. Put differently low income households need to smooth larger 
shocks (relative to their current income levels) and thus need to borrow more relative to current 
income. Post-Keynesian theory in general and Minsky in particular do not focus on the role of current 
income for borrowing purposes but emphasize the role of assets. The stock-flow-consistent tradition 
within Post-Keynesian economics argues that borrowing households are likely to have reached their 
wealth-to-income targets and thus borrow in order to consume part of that ‘excess’ wealth. Due to 
declining marginal propensities to consume towards the top of the income distribution this effect is 
smaller for high-income households and thus one expects a negative cross section effect. If one thinks 
about the expenditure cascades hypothesis a negative cross section effect is expected as well because, 
holding relative income constant, richer households need to borrow less for their desired status-
spending.  
If one thinks about the role of income on household borrowing in a cross section context it becomes 
clear that there is an important difference between borrowing households and non-borrowing 
households. Implicitly the previous paragraph focused on borrowing households. However since only 
a small proportion of households actually borrow in any current year but borrowing decisions are likely 
to result in a lengthy period of repayments, an asymmetry arises between the two groups for two 
reasons. First, if higher income households borrow less relative to their income, this implies that also 
their repayments are smaller relative to their income given that borrowing and repayment decisions 
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are not asymmetrically influenced by income. However because borrowing is defined as an increase in 
outstanding liabilities (∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 > 0) and repayment as a decrease (∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 < 0), income will have a negative 
impact on borrowing relative to income but a positive impact on repayments. The reason is that the 
terminology ‘smaller repayments’ actually refers to a less negative change and thus to a bigger 
number, resulting in a positive cross section effect. When discussing the effects on the non-borrowing 
sample positive effects are equivalent to smaller repayments and negative effects to larger 
repayments. However due to these different signs, analysing borrowing and non-borrowing 
households in the same sample will yield meaningless averages. Second, there is no reason to believe 
that household characteristics such as income will influence borrowing and repayment decisions in a 
symmetric way. For example if high income households choose to have shorter repayment periods one 
can easily think of examples where the proportion of borrowing relative to income between high and 
low income households and the proportion of repayments (relative to income) between high and low 
income households is different. Thus separating borrowing and non-borrowing households will yield 
differently signed effects of income on household borrowing due to the first argument and even in 
absolute values these effects are likely to differ due to the second argument. Therefore this paper will 
investigate the two groups separately.  
Beyond income the model incorporates measures of financial wealth (𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡) and most importantly 
residential real estate assets15. The actual purchase of real estate is one of the most important reasons 
why households take on debt. For that reason this paper distinguishes between housing assets which 
existed before the beginning of the period and the value of residential real estate purchased in the 
year of the interview. Thus the measure of housing wealth used in the paper (𝐻𝑊𝑖𝑡) consists of the 
current value of the primary residence and any other residential real estate minus the value and any 
potential capital gains on residential real estate purchased in the current period. The value at the time 
of purchase (thus excluding potential capital gains within the year) of residential real estate obtained 
in the current period (𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡) enters the empirical model separately. For exact definitions readers are 
again referred to Table A1 in the Appendix. Being able to include detailed information on asset 
purchases in addition to pre-period stocks is a major advantage of SCF data when it comes to assessing 
the explanatory power of the Minskyian households hypothesis. Since asset purchases are the most 
important reason to take on debt for the majority of households not being able to include this kind of 
information in one’s analysis will result in severely biased estimates. Economic theory predicts financial 
as well as real estate assets to influence household borrowing due to the presence of credit constraints 
                                                          
15 This means real estate purchased for investment purposes (buy-to-let) is not part of this housing wealth 
measure because the SCF does not report debt related to these properties separately but reports net values. 
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and ‘pure’ wealth effects. Thus for both measures one expects a positive cross section effect on 
borrowing relative to household income. Due to the negative sign of liability changes in the non-
borrowing sample, the effect of housing wealth is expected to be negative in the non-borrowing 
sample while the effect of current real estate purchases is expected to be close to zero since there are 
simply not many households being able to purchase without taking on debt 
Since the aim of the paper is to assess the role of relative income on household borrowing, the 
regression model also includes various measures of peer group income (?̃?𝑖𝑡). Several definitions are 
used and the details are discussed in the subsection below. For now it is sufficient to state that under 
the expenditure cascades hypothesis one expects those households being exposed to higher levels of 
peer group income, while holding their own income constant, to borrow more in order to keep up with 
the expenditures of that peer group and thus a positive effect. For the group of non-borrowing 
households one expects their repayments to be higher if they borrowed more in the past and thus a 
negative effect. Thus for similar reasons as in the case of income and housing wealth, most likely there 
is an asymmetry between borrowers and non-borrowers with respect to the expected signs.  
Another explanation for household borrowing which is closely related to the expenditure cascades 
hypothesis is that households borrow in order to sustain consumption levels in a situation of declining 
income. The argument is that people are unwilling to cut once-achieved standards of living. It is much 
harder to adjust downwards than upwards. Thus the regression also controls for those households 
whose income is lower than in a normal year by means of an indicator variable (𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 ). If past 
expenditure levels are important for current spending decisions those households with abnormally low 
incomes should borrow more or repay slower. Another interpretation is that households with 
abnormally low incomes will borrow less (repay quicker) out of a precautionary motive. Beside the 
relative position within the income distribution Duesenberry stressed past consumption as an 
important reference point in his Relative Income Hypothesis (Duesenberry 1949). The 
(microeconometric) literature discusses such phenomena under the label of habit formation (Dynan 
2000; Fuhrer 2000; Ravina 2007). Since the SCF does not have a panel structure the low-income dummy 
(𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡) is the only way to control for such effects.  
Finally outstanding liabilities at the end of the previous period (𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) are part of the empirical model. 
Since for most households borrowing results in a lengthy period of repayments, the amount still 
outstanding is an important predictor of these payments. On the other hand, for borrowing households 
one expects that already highly indebted households are less likely to be able to borrow even more. 
One potential exception arises if one thinks about households as ‘Minskian agents’ whose finance 
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structure becomes more and more risky over the boom period, eventually ending up in what Minsky 
labelled Ponzi finance which describes agents not able to repay principal nor interest out of current 
cash flows and who need to borrow for these payments. This approach predicts higher indebted 
households to borrow even more. Most likely however such behaviour is observed only over short 
periods of time and not over 13 years as in the current sample. Based on these considerations the 
regression is specified in the following way:  
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛽1
𝑆 ihs(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2
𝑆 ihs(?̃?𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3
𝑆 ihs(𝐻𝑊𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4
𝑆 ihs(𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  
𝛽5
𝑆 ihs(𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝛽6
𝑆ihs(𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7
𝑆𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8
𝑆𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜷
𝑆𝑿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
 
where 𝑆 = {𝐵, 𝑁𝐵} indicates the subsamples of borrowing and non-borrowing households, 𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  is 
a set of year dummies and 𝑿𝑡 is a matrix containing household characteristics such as age and age-
squared of the household head as well as dummies for the presence of children, for being married or 
living with a partner, for being part of the labour-force, for having a college degree, for having been 
denied when applying for credit and a set of race dummies. The motivation of including such a rich set 
of household characteristics is the inability to control for unobserved heterogeneity as it would be 
possible with a panel data set.  
The set of time dummies as well as the indicator variable for households having been turned down 
when applying for credit over the last four years are a way to control for shifts in credit supply 
conditions. If lenders are more willing to hand out larger loans relative to an households’ income level 
or stock of assets then this should affect households homogeneously across time and thus allowing for 
time varying intercepts should capture that. In contrast if lenders are become increasingly willing to 
accept customers which were not able to obtain credit in the past, then the effect of such a shift in 
credit conditions should affect those households which were denied access to credit in the past. A 
decline in the proportion of households reporting not able to obtain credit in the past then indicates a 
shift in the supply of credit towards low quality borrowers. 
Equation (2) is estimated by pooled OLS using probability weights. Weighted estimation is important 
because due to oversampling households from the upper tail of the income and wealth distribution 
would be overrepresented if all observations were implicitly assigned equal weights as in case of 
unweighted estimation. Standard errors are based on a bootstrap procedure which re-estimates each 
regression 999 times using a set of replicate weights instead of the initial weights. Replicate weights 
are part of the SCF dataset and are designed to replicate the sampling process. Since the Fed does not 
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publish the details of their sampling procedure in order to protect the privacy of the survey participants 
the replicate weights are the only way to obtain standard errors which take stratification and 
oversampling properly into account. Instead of taking logarithms of variables in Dollar terms, they are 
transformed using the (unscaled) inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (ihs) which is defined for zero 
and negative valued observations16 (MacKinnon & Magee 1990; Friedline et al. 2015).  
4.1 Defining Reference Groups 
Even though the idea of the expenditure cascades hypothesis that an increasingly polarized income 
distribution triggers debt financed spending as left-behind households attempt to maintain their 
perceived social status is quite simple, the task of testing it empirically is not. The main difficulty lies in 
defining adequate reference groups.  
Before going into details it is important to emphasize again that the expenditure cascades hypothesis 
strictly relies on upward looking status comparison. Only if households compare themselves with 
others higher up in the income distribution will an increase in income inequality lead to a cascade of 
debt-financed expenditures. In contrast if households rely on average income as their point of 
reference, a polarization in the distribution of income would not lead to an increase in spending and 
borrowing for households above the average. Thus even though the mean as a point of reference is 
common in the literature (Alpizar et al. 2005; Maurer & Meier 2008; Alvarez-Cuadrado & Vilalta 2012; 
Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2012), it is not consistent with the expenditure cascades hypothesis. For this 
reason the paper will not use average income as a point of reference. 
Instead the following three definitions of reference income, motivated by upward looking status 
comparison, are used. The first definition assumes that households compare themselves to richer 
peers at the top of the income distribution. In particular it is assumed that the pth income percentile is 
the point of reference for all households below that percentile. This approach is similar to Bertrand 
and Morse (2013) who use the 80th and 90th percentile of the income distribution within the state 
household 𝑖 lives in as the cut-off. While the assumption that status comparison takes place within 
regionally defined communities is plausible, US States are too large to serve as realistic proxies for such 
communities. This paper follows an alternative approach and defines reference groups based on 
educational achievement (college or less-than-college) and the racial background (white or black) of 
                                                          
16 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation applied is defined as: 𝑖ℎ𝑠(𝑥) = ln (𝑥 + √𝑥2 + 1). The 
attractiveness of this transformation stems from the fact that it can be applied to zero and negative values 
while the interpretation of ihs transformed data in a regression context is equivalent to log-transformed data 
since 
𝜕𝑖ℎ𝑠(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
=
1
√𝑥2+1
 which asymptotically approaches 
1
𝑥
 as x increases. 
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households, resulting in 4 groups17. The rationale for grouping along educational achievement and race 
is that both variables are important factors in defining the social sphere in which individuals engage 
with others through work, residency and leisure activities. The SCF provides four racial categories: 
white, black, hispanic and other. The reason for excluding the ‘other’ category in the definition of 
reference groups is that it is a residual category which identifies not a homogeneous group. However 
reference groups are motivated by the idea that households engage with and compare themselves to 
similar peers. The reason for dropping the hispanic category is of technical nature: The number of 
observations within the college-hispanic cells are too small to reliably calculate within group income 
distribution measures18.  
In contrast to Bertrand and Morse (2013) not only the 80th and 90th percentiles are used as cut-off 
points but the percentiles  𝑞 = {99, 95, 90, 80}. Since mainly the top 5% of households enjoyed above 
average income growth in the period 1995 to 2007 including the 99th and 95th percentiles is crucial in 
analysing the impact of income inequality on household spending and borrowing19. This first definition 
of reference income based on the percentile cut-off is denoted ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
 where 𝑝 indicates the use of the 
percentile as the point of reference and 𝑞 indicates the cut-off. With reference income defined in that 
way one expects that households which are exposed to higher levels of top-incomes in their education-
race group borrow more in order to finance a similar expenditure level as these richer peers. In order 
to distinguish peer effects from the effects of education and race a full set of race-education dummies 
along with all interactions is included in the regression. Thus the effect of ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
 is identified by the 
variation over time only. In a pure cross section ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
 would not be distinguishable from the effects of 
education and race captured by the set of dummies and their interactions. 
The second definition of reference income is very similar but instead of using income percentiles as 
reference points, the average household income above a chosen percentile is used as the point of 
reference. Percentiles are again computed for groups based on educational achievement (college and 
                                                          
17 The SCF includes identifiers for 9 regions, based on groups of US States, in the years 1995 and 1998 but not 
from 1998 onwards. As a robustness check income percentiles were computed within these regions and 
compared to the results based on education and race groupings, see Table A4 in the Appendix. Results do not 
differ systematically between specifications relying on geographically identified groups and race-education 
identified groups. 
18 For example in 1995 there are only 31 observations in the college-hispanic cell compared to 71 in the college-
black cell, 1,602 in college-white, 141 in no-college-hispanic, 285 in no-college-black and 1,839 in no-college-
white.  
19 This becomes even more important when grouping households along education and race as income gains are 
even more concentrated towards the top within these finer groups compared to the nationwide income 
distribution. 
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less-than-college) and race (white, black). Compared to the first definition, the average income above 
a certain percentile also obtains information about the households above that percentile. In particular 
the evolution of the average income of e.g. the top 5% of all households (i.e. households above the 
95th percentile) is a better indicator about the income share of that group and thus the evolution of 
the income distribution than just the 95th percentile. Percentiles 𝑞 = {99, 95, 90, 80} are used as cut-
off points. This second definition of reference income based on averages above a certain percentile is 
labelled ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣𝑞
 where 𝑎𝑣 indicates the use of income averages and 𝑞 indicates the cut-off. Since for 
those households with income levels in excess of the cut-off there is no reference point defined, these 
are excluded from the estimation. This is the case for ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣𝑞
 as well as ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
. Under the expenditure 
cascades hypothesis the effect of ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣𝑞
 on household borrowing is expected to be positive. 
The third definition is closely related to the measure of relative income used by Carr and Jayadev 
(2014). They cluster households based on which US State they live in and then the proportion of 
households within that group which are richer than household i is used as a proxy for household i's 
relative income. Since US States are too large to serve as meaningful proxies for communities within 
which status comparison takes place, this paper again relies on education and race based groups 𝑔:  
?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 =
∑ 𝐼[𝐼 = 1|𝑌−𝑖𝑔𝑡 > 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡]
𝑁𝑔𝑡
 (3) 
where 𝐼 ∈ {0,1} is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a given observation’s income is greater than 
observation 𝑖's income. 𝑔 ∈ {1, … ,4}  represents the four groups of households clustered by education 
(college or less-than-college) and race (white or black). Thus  ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 corresponds to the complementary 
cumulative distribution function of income within group 𝑔. As such it is very different from the previous 
two definitions because it does not provide an absolute measure of within-group income 
concentration which is comparable across groups. Instead it provides information of the relative 
position for individual households within the group. ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑  is expected to yield a positive effect on 
household debt accumulation in the borrowing and in the non-borrowing sample. Higher values of 
?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 are associated with households which are relatively poor in their race-education group, thus are 
exposed to a large number of richer peers and thus are expected to borrow more or repay slower. 
There are three important drawbacks with this definition of relative income. First, it implies that 
expenditure cascades become stronger towards the bottom of the within group income distribution. 
A priori it is not clear whether this should be the case. Instead if households are only partially able to 
keep up with their richer peers it might even be the case that expenditure cascades decline towards 
the bottom of the within group distribution. Second, defining relative income in that way does not 
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provide any information about the degree of within group income concentration towards the top, 
which is central for the expenditure cascades argument. Thus using ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 is equivalent of focussing 
on the within group position in the income distribution at the expense of ignoring the absolute degree 
of inequality within that group compared across groups. Put differently, one assumes that households 
do not care by how much their peers are richer than themselves but they care only about how many 
other households are richer (a headcount of richer households, thus the labelling). The expenditure 
cascades hypothesis however rests on a situation of growing within group income inequality. Third, 
due to the focus of within group variation this measure does not allow one to assess to what extent 
rising income inequality contributed to household borrowing across time. It can only be used to explain 
differences between households. 
Summing up: the paper uses three different version of relative income: The first two measure the 
absolute degree of inequality within education-race groups and are defined as the qth percentile of the 
education-race group income distribution (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
) and the average income above the qth percentile 
(?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣𝑞
). The third measure is defined as the complementary cumulative distribution function of income 
within education-race groups (?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) which corresponds to a head count of households richer than 
household 𝑖. 
5 Heterogeneity, Reference Income and Housing Wealth Effects in 
Household Debt Accumulation 
Table 2 presents the first set of results. Equation () is estimated for three different samples: the 
borrowing and non-borrowing subsamples as well as for the full sample (containing borrowing and 
non-borrowing households). Since all independent variables denominated in monetary terms are 
subject to the inverse-hyperbolic-sine transformation the estimated coefficients in Table 2 can be 
interpreted as changes in household borrowing in % of income due to a 1% increase of the 
corresponding explanatory variable. In order to interpret the results correctly it is important to keep 
in mind that repayment is ‘negative borrowing’ and thus a positive coefficient in the non-borrowing 
sample indicates less ‘negative borrowing’ and thus less repayments. As expected, there is a 
pronounced asymmetry in household behaviour between borrowing and non-borrowing groups as is 
indicated by the vastly different coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2). Combining borrowing and 
non-borrowing households in one group as in column (3) yields misleading averages which fail to 
adequately describe the behaviour of either group. For this reason the borrowing and non-borrowing 
sample are analysed separately from here on. 
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Beyond these differences in behaviour, results in Table 2 indicate that with rising income levels, 
households borrow less relative to their income (columns 1 and 4) and also use a smaller proportion 
of their income for repayments (columns 2 and 5). Thus lower income households leverage up more, 
relative to income. These findings are compatible with the life-cycle model if one assumes that higher 
income households face smaller shocks relative to their income. It is also compatible with the Post-
Keynesian stock-flow-consistent modelling tradition which assumes borrowing for consumption 
purposes will be smaller relative to income for high income household due to lower marginal 
propensities to consume. Also the expenditure cascades hypothesis predicts a negative impact of 
income on household borrowing because richer households are less dependent on borrowing in order 
to finance a given level of status consumption.  
With respect to housing, Table 2 reveals that there are highly statistically significant positive effects of 
housing wealth (𝐻𝑊) and real estate purchases (𝑅𝐸𝑃) on household borrowing (columns 1 and 4). It 
means that holding everything else constant higher levels of housing wealth lead to more borrowing. 
In addition, purchasing residential real estate in the year of the interview has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on borrowing. Since purchasing real estate without taking out a mortgage is highly 
unusual the insignificant effect in the non-borrowing sample is not surprising. Overall these results are 
very well in line with a life-cycle model incorporating credit constraints, with a Minskian interpretation 
of the relationship between assets and leverage and also with the notion of households being 
anchored by assets-to-income ratios as argued by the stock-flow-consistent modelling tradition. Thus 
the importance of assets and especially housing assets predicted by these theories in line with the 
hypothesis of Minskyian households is strongly supported by the data. 
Financial wealth (𝐹𝑊) has neither a statistically significant effect on borrowing nor non-borrowing 
households. This might be due to the fact that even though financial wealth should ease credit 
constraints in a similar way as housing wealth does, banks are much more reluctant to accept financial 
assets with potentially highly volatile prices as collateral. Total liabilities at the beginning of the period 
(𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) only have a statistically significant effect on the non-borrowing group indicating that higher 
indebted households use a larger proportion of their income for repayments. The lack of a significant 
effect of outstanding liabilities on borrowing is unexpected since the life-cycle model which 
emphasizes net-wealth as well as the stock-flow-consistent modelling tradition predict a negative 
effect. On the other hand a Minsky inspired interpretation suggests that heavily indebted households 
might have to rely on new borrowing in order to keep up with payments, predicting a positive effect. 
If both arguments are valid potentially at different stages of the credit cycle (i.e. the Minsky argument 
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only holding shortly before the peak) they might cancel each other out over longer sample periods 
leaving a statistically insignificant result.  
While it became clear that assets and outstanding liabilities are crucial in determining household 
borrowing decisions, Table 2 also reveals the importance of the income distribution. Reference 
income, defined as the average income of the top 1% of households within the education and race 
groups (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣99) has a highly significant positive effect in the group of borrowing households (column 
1). Thus a 1% increase in average incomes at the top leads to an increase in household borrowing by 
0.2% of household income. This result strongly supports the expenditure cascades hypothesis: 
Households being exposed to a more unequal distribution of income borrow more relative to their 
household income. For the non-borrowing sample the effect is not statistically different from zero and 
thus being exposed to richer peers does not slow down repayment efforts. The fact that repayment 
conditions are agreed on in advance provides an explanation. Put differently households have a hard 
time to explaining to their bank a delay in payments due to the neighbour buying a bigger car. 
In specifications (1) to (3) in Table 2, the effect of average top incomes (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣99) does not depend on 
any measure of credit constraints. However it is not clear how households without any relevant assets 
should be able to secure additional borrowing in order to finance status driven expenditures. Thus it 
might be the case that only unconstrained households are able to engage in status seeking borrowing 
cascades. In order to control for that possibility, columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 report the results of 
estimating equation (2) with the measure of average top income (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣99) interacted with a dummy for 
residential real estate ownership (𝐻𝑊1 indicating ownership and 𝐻𝑊0 no ownership). The results do 
indeed support the hypothesis that reference incomes only affect non-credit constrained households, 
in this case owners, since the effect for non-owners is statistically not different from 0. At the same 
time the effects of the other variables remain unchanged compared to the specification without the 
interaction terms. This is an important finding because it indicates that while the distribution of income 
does matter via status comparison across households and so called expenditure cascades it also 
indicates that only those households which possess some form of collateral are actually able to react 
to this kind of peer pressure by increasing their own expenditures using borrowed money. So 
household borrowing is determined in a complex interaction of different channels and it seems that in 
isolation neither the expenditure cascades hypothesis nor the hypothesis of Minskyian households are 
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able to fully explain household borrowing20. Only an interaction of inequality and asset prices and thus 
a conditional version of the expenditure cascades hypothesis can provide such an explanation. 
 
Table 2: Baseline Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 full ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 
?̃? cut-off 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 
?̃? definition av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. 
𝑌 -0.314 0.042 0.001 -0.314 0.042 
 (0.024)*** (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.023)*** (0.003)*** 
?̃?𝑎𝑣99 0.216 0.009 0.056   
 (0.080)*** (0.006) (0.019)***   
𝐻𝑊0#?̃?𝑎𝑣99    0.089 0.004 
    (0.115) (0.006) 
𝐻𝑊1#?̃?𝑎𝑣99    0.289 0.010 
    (0.085)*** (0.007) 
𝐻𝑊 0.086 -0.002 0.006 0.090 -0.003 
 (0.017)*** (0.001) (0.003)* (0.017)*** (0.001)** 
𝑅𝐸𝑃 0.659 0.011 0.539 0.658 0.012 
 (0.047)*** (0.011) (0.038)*** (0.048)*** (0.011) 
𝐹𝑊 0.008 -0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
𝐷𝑡−1 -0.005 -0.024 -0.024 -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.009) (0.001)*** 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.758 -0.555 -0.669 2.607 -0.480 
 (1.176) (0.086)*** (0.269)** (1.710) (0.093)*** 
N 2,229 14,270 16,510 2,229 14,270 
av. R2 0.65 0.27 0.51 0.65 0.27 
time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
household 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variable: ΔD/Y. All independent variables are subject to the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. Y~ is defined as the average income above the 99th percentile within education-race 
groups (college/less-than-college and black/white). Coefficients are estimated by OLS using probability 
weights. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by re-estimating the regression 999 times using a set 
of 999 replicate weights. The R2 is the average across all implicates. Stars indicate 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) significance levels. A full table including the missing household characteristics and time effects is 
provided in the Appendix (Table A2). 
 
                                                          
20 Table A3 in the Appendix presents fully separated specifications for owners and non-owners. 
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The results so far are based on a specification using ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣99 as the reference income definition. In order 
to check the robustness of these results Table 3 reports additional specifications incorporating 
alternative definitions of reference income. Using other definitions than the average income of the top 
1% of households has two important implications. First, using cut-off points other than the top 1% 
serves as a robustness check to the question whether expenditure cascades are triggered by 
concentration of income at the very top of the distribution. Second, using relative income measures 
based on percentiles (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
) as well as the relative position within the group (?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) provides a test of 
other mechanisms through which status comparison might takes place and expenditure cascades 
occur.  
Table 3 demonstrates that using different percentiles as cut-off points for computing the average 
income of the top groups still yields statistically significant and positive effects on household borrowing 
(column 1: 95th percentile and column 2: 80th percentile) while the effects of the other variables remain 
qualitatively unchanged. However only the 99th percentile cut-off used in Table 2, yields statistically 
significant effects at the 1 % level, indicating that expenditure cascades are triggered from the very top 
of the income distribution. When instead of the average income above the cut-off only the income at 
the cut-off is used in the estimations (columns 3 to 5 and 9 to 11), there is no statistically significant 
effect of reference income on household borrowing. Defining relative income as the proportion of 
richer households (?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) yields a negative and statistically highly significant effect on household 
borrowing (column 6) both for owners and non-owners. Thus households towards the bottom of the 
within group income distribution borrow less. The negative effect of  ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑  in the non-borrowing 
sample (column 12) indicates that households towards the bottom of the within group income 
distribution use a larger proportion of their income for repayments. Thus the results for ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 do not 
support the expenditure cascades hypothesis. Due to the focus on within group variation of  ?̃?𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 
instead of across group variation, this paper prefers the other two definitions of relative income based 
on top group averages (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣𝑞
) and percentile cut-off values (?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑞
). 
The effects of housing wealth (𝐻𝑊) and real estate purchases in the current year (𝑅𝐸𝑃) do not change 
while using different measures of reference income. Thus Table 3 demonstrates the robust support of 
the data for the hypothesis of Minskyian households. However up to now the discussion of the results 
solely focussed on the statistical significance and the signs of the estimated effects in order to judge 
whether they are in line with predictions from economic theory. The next step is to assess the 
economic significance of the estimated effects and to compute comparable effect size measures. This 
is done in the next section.  
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Table 3: Additional Reference Income Definitions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 
?̃? definition ?̃?𝑎𝑣95 ?̃?𝑎𝑣80 ?̃?𝑝99 ?̃?𝑝95 ?̃?𝑝80 ?̃?ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 ?̃?𝑎𝑣95 ?̃?𝑎𝑣80 ?̃?𝑝99 ?̃?𝑝95 ?̃?𝑝80 ?̃?ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 
?̃? cut-off 95th perc 80th perc 99th perc 95th perc 80th perc none 95th perc 80th perc 99th perc 95th perc 80th perc none 
𝑌 -0.307 -0.327 -0.313 -0.307 -0.327 -0.517 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.025 
 (0.026)*** (0.032)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.032)*** (0.073)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
𝐻𝑊0#?̃? 0.121 0.191 0.047 0.159 0.294 -0.645 -0.004 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 0.005 0.002 
 (0.171) (0.235) (0.141) (0.245) (0.380) (0.215)*** (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) 
𝐻𝑊1#?̃? 0.203 0.330 0.014 0.052 0.467 -0.666 0.009 0.017 0.004 0.011 0.029 -0.089 
 (0.105)* (0.142)** (0.071) (0.164) (0.305) (0.197)*** (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.019) (0.013)*** 
𝐻𝑊 0.110 0.115 0.095 0.113 0.115 0.095 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.016)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑃 0.752 0.857 0.659 0.751 0.856 0.606 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.012 
 (0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.047)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.045)*** (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) 
𝐹𝑊 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)* 
𝐷𝑡−1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.025 -0.028 -0.024 -0.025 -0.027 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.238 1.669 3.258 1.839 0.538 6.511 -0.383 -0.331 -0.297 -0.288 -0.496 -0.251 
 (2.345) (3.025) (1.921)* (3.127) (4.612) (0.945)*** (0.127)*** (0.184)* (0.122)** (0.163)* (0.331) (0.065)*** 
N 2,242 2,024 2,477 2,242 2,024 2,722 14,183 12,971 15,931 14,183 12,971 18,358 
Dependent variable: ΔD/Y. All $ valued independent variables are subject to the inverse hyperbolic since transformation. Coefficients are estimated by OLS using probability 
weights. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by re-estimating the regression 999 times using a set of 999 replicate weights. Stars indicate 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 
(*) significance levels. A full table including the missing household characteristics and time effects is available upon request. 
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6 Aggregate Effect Size of Housing Wealth and Relative Income  
In order to compare the explanatory power of the expenditure cascades and the Minskyian households 
hypotheses, contributions to the predicted value of household borrowing are calculated. For example 
in the case of housing wealth (𝐻𝑊) the contribution of housing wealth to the accumulation of debt in 
year 𝑡 aggregated over all households is calculated as: 
Ω𝑡
𝐻𝑊,𝑆 = ∑ ?̂?3
𝑆 𝑖ℎ𝑠(𝐻𝑊𝑖𝑡) 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1
 
(4) 
where 𝑆 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑁𝐵} indicates that the computation is done for the borrowing (𝐵) as well as the non-
borrowing (𝑁𝐵) subsample. Equivalent computations are carried out for all independent variables in 
the model. Even though the contributions are not very useful for cross section comparisons they are 
useful in shading light on the questions which household characteristics are most important in order 
to explain household borrowing over time21. 
Table 4 presents the contributions of the main variables of interest: household income, relative income 
and household balance sheet items. Also the overall model prediction is reported in the first column. 
Based on equation (4) contributions are computed for each subgroup, expressed as the difference 
relative to 1995 and scaled by aggregate income. For example the housing effect reported in Table 4 
is computed as: 
∆Ω𝑡
𝐻𝑊 = (Ω𝑡
𝐻𝑊,𝐵 + Ω𝑡
𝐻𝑊,𝑁𝐵 − Ω1995
𝐻𝑊,𝐵 − Ω1995
𝐻𝑊,𝑁𝐵)/𝒀𝑡 (5) 
where 𝒀𝑡 is aggregate income of the actual sample, excluding households which identify as hispanic or 
other and households with borrowing to income ratios smaller than -250% and bigger than 500% but  
including those households above the cut-off points used for the definition of relative income. Panel A 
of Table 4 is based on the results from columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 using the average income of 
households above the 99th percentile of the within group income distribution as reference income and 
Panel B uses the average income of households above the 95th percentile of the within group income 
distribution (columns 1 and 7 Table 3). The different measures of reference income are the main 
reason why contributions of individual variables as well as predicted total borrowing differ across the 
two Panels: Panel B is based on a smaller sample excluding not only the top 1% of the within group 
income distributions but the top 5%. However the sample size is not the only reason why results vary. 
Another important reason is that top 1% income shares and thus average income increased much 
                                                          
21 One way to compare the contribution of individual variables in the cross section would be to demean the 
regressors prior to estimation. Since the focus here is on changes over time demeaning was not performed 
because it complicates comparison across time. 
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stronger than top 5% income shares over the sample period. Thus while absolute effects are not 
comparable between Panel A and B the relative sizes of the effects are.  
 
Table 4: contributions to household borrowing relative to 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: top 1%           
  total 𝐻𝑊0 # ?̃?𝑎𝑣99 ?̃?𝑎𝑣99 + 𝐻𝑊 𝑌 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐹𝑊 𝐷𝑡−1 
1998  0.8% -0.5% 5.9% -3.3% 0.6% 0.7% -1.3% 
2001  1.1% -0.1% 6.2% -2.3% 1.1% 0.4% -3.2% 
2004  7.0% 1.2% 11.2% -8.6% 6.8% 1.7% -3.6% 
2007  2.3% -0.3% 8.7% -2.9% 3.5% 0.5% -4.7% 
        
Panel B: top 5%          
  total 𝐻𝑊0 # ?̃?𝑎𝑣95 ?̃?𝑎𝑣95 + 𝐻𝑊 𝑌 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐹𝑊 𝐷𝑡−1 
1998  1.0% -0.8% 3.7% -1.3% 0.3% 0.3% -1.0% 
2001  0.8% -0.6% 4.3% -0.7% 0.3% 0.3% -2.3% 
2004  5.6% 1.4% 6.7% -4.1% 4.6% 0.8% -3.0% 
2007  2.0% -0.4% 4.6% 0.1% 2.4% 0.2% -3.5% 
Contributions to household borrowing are computed based on results from columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 for 
Panel A and from columns 1 and 7 of Table 3 for Panel B using equation (5). Values correspond to changes in 
household borrowing with respect to 1995 expressed in % of aggregate sample income (1998: $6,893 bn; 
2001: $8,611 bn; 2004: $8,584 bn; 2007: $9,573 bn in 2013 prices). Total refers to the total change in 
household borrowing. Total is based on all variables and thus is not equivalent to the sum of the variables 
displayed in the Table. Full tables containing the contributions of all variables in the model can be found in the 
Appendix (Tables A5 and A6). 
 
Since the effect of reference income is interacted with a housing ownership dummy in the specification 
used to calculate the contributions, the contribution of changes in housing wealth and reference 
income cannot be distinguished for the group of owners22. For that reason Table 4 presents the effect 
of reference income for non-owners (column 2) and a combined effect of reference income and real 
estate wealth for owners (column 3). First Table 4 shows that household borrowing strongly increased 
in 2004: the difference in household borrowing between 2004 and 1995 amounts to 7% of household 
income or 600 billion in 2013 prices23. The effect of rising within group top incomes contributed to 
additional household borrowing of 1.2% ($104 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣99) and 1.4% ($120 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣95) 
of household income among non-owners, depending on the relative income measure used. In contrast 
the combined effect of increasing housing wealth and top incomes stimulated household borrowing 
                                                          
22 The reason is that the positive effects of reference income and housing wealth need to be summed up with 
the negative effect of the ownership dummy and there is no meaningful way of separating the effect of 
reference income and ownership and changes in housing wealth.  
23 All subsequent dollar values are expressed in 2013 prices. 
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during the same period by 11.2% ($963 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣99) and 6.7% ($575 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣95) of 
household income. With both specifications this partial effect exceeds the total amount of additional 
borrowing in all years, emphasizing the importance of the interaction of housing and relative income 
dynamics. In addition to existing assets also real estate purchases in the current period significantly 
contributed to the leveraging up process of the household sector: by 6.8% ($ 584 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣99) 
and 4.6% ($395 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣95) respectively. The growth in household income reduces household 
borrowing over the same period by 8.6% ($740 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣99) and 4.1% ($352 billion with ?̃?𝑎𝑣95). 
Table 4 also demonstrates the crucial role of past liabilities for household borrowing (-3.6% and -3% in 
2004). Increasing debt levels slowed down the accumulation of new liabilities. The negative 
contribution of past liabilities on borrowing almost exclusively works through the group of non-
borrowing households: with increasing debt levels households have to use larger proportions of their 
disposable income to repay principal and interest. 
Based on these numbers, the paper confirms earlier findings in support of the expenditure cascades 
hypothesis but emphasizes the fundamental role of real estate assets in easing credit constraints: 
Expenditure cascades only materialise if households can rely on some form of collateral for borrowing 
in order to keep up in status driven expenditure cascades. Thus simple statements of the expenditure 
cascades hypothesis which ignore the limiting role of credit constraints do not describe the pre-2007 
experience of the US very well. The interaction between homeownership and income inequality calls 
for an integrated analysis of household borrowing which takes relative income as well as household 
balance sheet dynamics properly into account.  
The results presented also strongly emphasize the importance of real estate transactions and past 
liabilities which increase the intensity of repayments. Both factors are often overlooked when studying 
household borrowing behaviour.  
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7 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the rise in US household debt levels prior to the financial crisis. Two potential 
explanations are of particular interest: First, according to the expenditure cascades hypothesis, upward 
looking status comparison in an environment of increasing income inequality triggers debt-financed 
consumption sprees which cascade down the income distribution. Against the background of strongly 
rising top incomes in the United States several authors argue on theoretical (Cardaci 2014; Frank et al. 
2014; Kapeller & Schütz 2014; Ryoo & Kim 2014; Nikiforos 2015; Cynamon & Fazzari 2015) and 
empirical (Belabed et al. 2013; Bertrand & Morse 2013; Carr & Jayadev 2014; Perugini et al. 2015) 
grounds that expenditure cascades explain the rise in household debt and therefore identify it as a 
root cause of the financial crisis. The second explanation of interest is the hypothesis of Minskyian 
households, which argues that rising real estate prices boost household borrowing because of equity 
extraction by increasingly optimistic owners and the demand for bigger mortgages by (first time) 
buyers. This latter line of thinking is compatible with much of the literature on wealth effects in the 
consumption function if one allows for credit constrained households (Paiella 2009; Cooper & Dynan 
2014). However the life-cycle model has difficulties in explaining why rational consumers did not 
anticipate the transitory nature of the surge in house prices. Thus using a Minskyian framework for 
explaining pre-2007 events appears to be a more realistic description of reality (Minsky 1978; Borio 
2014; Ryoo 2015). 
By constructing a measure of annual household borrowing from cross sectional data from the SCF, the 
paper is able to put the unmatched quality and level of detail the SCF provides to work. It means in 
particular that the results of this paper are based on the only US household survey which deals with 
the problem of non-observation and non-response of rich households in a convincing way by means 
of oversampling based on information from the federal tax authority. Furthermore the SCF offers an 
extremely detailed breakdown of the household balance sheet in terms of liabilities and assets. Thus 
since the expenditure cascades hypotheses focuses on the role of income inequality while the 
hypothesis of Minskyian households emphasizes the positive impact of rising asset values on 
household borrowing, the SCF provides unmatched high quality data to investigate both hypotheses. 
The results presented based on this newly created measure of household borrowing indicates that it 
is the interaction of rising asset prices and the polarization of the income distribution which explains a 
large part of the increase in household borrowing before the crisis in 2008. In particular, the results 
support the expenditure cascades hypothesis conditional on homeownership. Thus higher average 
incomes for the top 1% of households within race (white, black) and education (less-than-college, 
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college) groups result in higher borrowing-to-income ratios for owners. Households can only engage 
in status driven borrowing if they have access to collateral and if the value of that asset increases. The 
magnitudes of these effects are substantial: household borrowing in 2004 was by $963 billion24 higher 
compared to 1995 due to the increase in income inequality and the rise in housing wealth. In addition 
household borrowing in 2004 was higher compared to 1995 by an additional $584 billion due to the 
increased cost of purchasing properties. Rising household income had a negative impact on borrowing 
over the same period of $740 billion. In total households borrowed $600 billion more in 2004 
compared to 1995. These results strongly suggest that explaining US household borrowing up to 2007 
requires information on the shifts in the distribution of income as well as on the increasing value of 
real estate assets. Using only one part of the explanation without the other misses a large part of the 
story. Thus this paper calls for a synthesis of these two strands of the literature. Relative income 
(income inequality) and (housing) wealth should be treated as equally important and plausible 
mechanisms when analysing household debt.  
The implications of the findings presented above are substantial. First, the distribution of income is a 
relevant factor in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. Indirectly the results challenge a standard 
assumption in Keynesian models: due to higher marginal saving rates towards the top of the income 
distribution, a redistribution of income towards the top reduces aggregate consumption. It seems that 
as long as the financial sector accommodates households’ demand for credit a positive relationship 
between income inequality and consumption is possible. Second, (housing) asset price dynamics are 
important for aggregate household liability levels. The degree of importance will vary across countries 
depending on whether an ownership culture like in the US or a renter culture like in Germany prevails, 
but the asset side of the household balance sheet cannot be ignored when investigating household 
borrowing. Third, due to the large effects of relative income and housing wealth on household 
borrowing, the distribution of income as well as house prices are key indicators for monitoring the 
financial stability of the household sector. Large scale defaults will translate into less consumption 
spending and thus lower growth rates and also have the potential for critical knock-on effects in the 
financial sector. Fourth, limiting the impact of expenditure cascades requires policy measures which 
result in a more equal primary distribution of income in order to tackle the root cause of the problem. 
Minimum wage legislation, affordable access to high quality education and a clampdown on tax havens 
might be noteworthy strategies. In addition, increases in the public provision of housing in regions with 
                                                          
24 Expressed in 2013 prices. 
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strong demand and weak private supply will keep price increases in check. This will prevent borrowing 
sprees backed by unsustainable house price booms.  
The paper also provides methodological insights for investigating household borrowing behaviour 
when using survey data. First, with cross sectional data, borrowing and non-borrowing households 
need to be analysed separately. Borrowing and repayment decisions are driven by different variables: 
assets for example are more important for borrowing decisions due to their role in easing credit 
constraints while liabilities have a direct impact on repayments. Furthermore, variables which 
influence borrowing and repayment decisions do so in different ways, as the example of household 
income demonstrates. The benefits of a separate analysis also materialize in an increased model fit. 
Second, for the majority of households the most important borrowing decision is to take out a 
mortgage in order to buy a property. This means that the analysis of household borrowing requires 
either panel data which automatically provides information on purchases (as long as assets are 
observed) or in a cross section context information about the timing of purchases is needed in order 
to be able to explain the large spikes in household borrowing related to property acquisitions. Third, 
growth rates of household liabilities are not an informative indicator because household borrowing 
(due to property purchases) is not a smooth process like consumption and thus identical growth rates 
can refer to households engaging in very different behaviour. Furthermore due to the relevance of 
large one-off borrowing decisions, the use of logarithmic differences in order to proxy growth rates is 
highly inaccurate. Using absolute changes in household liabilities scaled by household income is a more 
informative and robust approach.  
Finally, there remain problems which need to be addressed in future research. First, so far a positive 
link between (household) debt and the distribution of income is more consistently supported by 
microeconomic than by aggregate data. It is not yet clear why this is the case, although most of the 
evidence based on aggregate data relies on panel rather than time series techniques for individual 
countries. Second, the lack of data is a fundamental problem for studying the links between the 
distribution of income, asset prices and household liabilities. One specific way to enhance future 
research would be to conduct high quality surveys relying on oversampling methods using household 
level tax data. In the first wave of the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey only nine out 
of fifteen participating countries made an effort to oversample wealthy households and only Spain and 
France relied on individual tax information to do so (ECB 2013). More effort and dedication from local 
central banks and tax authorities is needed. In addition central banks should provide more resources 
for collecting data in order to enable bigger samples and, most importantly, shorter intervals of data 
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collection. Three year intervals as with the SCF and the HFCS leave substantial gaps which would be 
unimaginable in the case of GDP or inflation. 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure A1: Average annual real income growth rates 
 
Source: own computations based on SCF waves 1989 to 2013. 
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step 1:
tB ≤? year ᴧ use = ?
case 1: 
tB=year ᴧ use=ref
implies: ΔD=D-B 
case 2:
tB=year ᴧ use=extr
implies: ΔD=ex
case 3:
tB=year ᴧ
use=extr+ref
implies: ΔD=ex+D-B
case 4:
tB=year ᴧ use=0
implies: ΔD=D
case 5:
tB<year
no conclusion yet about ΔD
step 2:
B ? D
case 5.1:
tB<year ᴧ B>D
implies: ΔD=-P
case 5.2:
tB<year ᴧ B=D
implies: ΔD=0
case 5.3:
tB<year ᴧ B<D
implies: ΔD=-P
Figure A2: Decision tree, first mortgage on primary residence 
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Table A1: Variable description 
Variable Description SCF code/name 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 
Household borrowing defined as the change in 
outstanding liabilities within year 𝑡. The way how 
the measure is constructed is discussed in section 
3.2 and Appendix B. 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 
Outstanding liabilities at the beginning of the 
period, derived from the definition: 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 ≡ 𝐷𝑖𝑡 −
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  
Total gross income as reported by the household. 
Including realized capital gains. Before taxes and 
other deductions.  
Corresponds to the 
variable ‘income’ in the 
summary data set. 
𝐻𝑊𝑖𝑡 
Value of residential real estate, minus the value of 
residential real estate purchases in the current 
period and minus any capital gains on these 
purchases. Thus 𝐻𝑊𝑖𝑡 corresponds to the value of 
residential real estate the household owned at the 
beginning of the period. 
Residential real estate 
corresponds to the 
variables ‘houses’ and 
‘oresre’ in the summary 
dataset. For the detailed 
computations see Stata 
code. 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 
Value of real estate purchases in the current 
period, excluding capital gains on these purchases. 
 
𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 
Total value of financial assets. Includes: checkings 
and savings accounts, money market accounts, 
certificates of deposits, directly held mutual funds, 
stocks, bonds, quasi liquid pension accounts, 
savings bonds, cash in life-insurance products, 
other managed assets and other financial assets. 
Coded ‘fin’ in the 
summary dataset. 
?̃? 
Definitions of relative income measures are 
discussed in section 4.1. 
 
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 
Age of the household head. Coded ‘age’ in the 
summary dataset. 
𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating the presence of 
children. 
Based on variable ‘kids’ 
from summary dataset. 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Dummy variable, 1 indicating the household head 
obtaining a college degree. 
Based on variable ‘edcl’ 
from summary dataset. 
𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating household head self-
identified as black. 
Based on variable ‘race’ 
from summary dataset. 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating household head is 
part of the labour force. 
Coded ‘lf’ in summary 
dataset. 
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating household income is 
lower than in normal year. 
Based on X7650 in full 
data set. 
𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating household head is 
not married or living with a partner. 
Coded ‘married’ in 
summary dataset. 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 
Dummy variable, 1 indicating that in the past five 
years the household had been turned down when 
applying for credit . 
Coded ‘turndown’ in the 
summary data set. Based 
on X407 in full data set. 
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Table A2, Part1: Complete version of Table 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 full ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 
Y~ cut-off 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 
Y~ reference definition av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. 
Y -0.314 0.042 0.001 -0.314 0.042 
 (0.024)*** (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.023)*** (0.003)*** 
Y~ 0.216 0.009 0.056   
 (0.080)*** (0.006) (0.019)***   
HW0 # Y~    0.089 0.004 
    (0.115) (0.006) 
HW1 # Y~    0.289 0.010 
    (0.085)*** (0.007) 
HW 0.086 -0.002 0.006 0.090 -0.003 
 (0.017)*** (0.001) (0.003)* (0.017)*** (0.001)** 
dHW -1.004 0.006 -0.077 -3.889 -0.074 
 (0.200)*** (0.016) (0.035)** (1.526)** (0.108) 
REP 0.659 0.011 0.539 0.658 0.012 
 (0.047)*** (0.011) (0.038)*** (0.048)*** (0.011) 
dREP -6.506 -0.150 -5.077 -6.507 -0.153 
 (0.563)*** (0.144) (0.435)*** (0.576)*** (0.144) 
FW 0.008 -0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
dFW 0.228 -0.006 0.038 0.188 -0.004 
 (0.077)*** (0.007) (0.011)*** (0.081)** (0.006) 
Dt-1 -0.005 -0.024 -0.024 -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.009) (0.001)*** 
dDt-1  0.148 0.215  0.149 
  (0.005)*** (0.022)***  (0.005)*** 
kids 0.035 -0.001 0.011 0.039 -0.001 
 (0.023) (0.002) (0.004)** (0.022)* (0.002) 
age -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.005) (0.000) 
age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2,229 14,270 16,510 2,229 14,270 
av. R2 0.65 0.27 0.51 0.65 0.27 
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Table A2, Part 2: Complete version of Table 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 full ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 
Y~ cut-off 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 
Y~ reference definition av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. 
college -0.269 -0.012 -0.073 -0.080 -0.016 
 (0.111)** (0.008) (0.025)*** (0.163) (0.009)* 
HW1#college    -0.297 0.006 
    (0.147)** (0.011) 
black 0.218 -0.002 0.044 -0.038 0.000 
 (0.100)** (0.007) (0.023)* (0.153) (0.007) 
HW1#black    0.443 -0.012 
    (0.149)*** (0.008) 
college#black 0.438 0.008 0.094 0.509 -0.006 
 (0.098)*** (0.007) (0.022)*** (0.134)*** (0.010) 
HW1#collge#black    -0.145 0.029 
    (0.211) (0.015)* 
working -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.048) (0.003) (0.008) (0.047) (0.003) 
lowinc 0.039 -0.017 -0.005 0.039 -0.016 
 (0.030) (0.003)*** (0.007) (0.029) (0.003)*** 
not married -0.031 0.011 -0.007 -0.033 0.011 
 (0.022) (0.002)*** (0.005) (0.023) (0.002)*** 
turndown 0.035 -0.005 0.023 0.030 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.003)* (0.007)*** (0.023) (0.003) 
dum1995 -0.035 0.005 0.011 -0.035 0.005 
 (0.029) (0.003)* (0.007) (0.029) (0.003)* 
dum2001 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.003) (0.007) (0.033) (0.003) 
dum2004 0.063 0.004 0.023 0.062 0.003 
 (0.032)* (0.002) (0.007)*** (0.033)* (0.002) 
dum2007 -0.074 0.003 -0.008 -0.075 0.003 
 (0.042)* (0.003) (0.009) (0.044)* (0.003) 
constant 0.758 -0.555 -0.669 2.607 -0.480 
 (1.176) (0.086)*** (0.269)** (1.710) (0.093)*** 
N 2,229 14,270 16,510 2,229 14,270 
av. R2 0.65 0.27 0.51 0.65 0.27 
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Table A3, Part 1: Owner vs non-owner split 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 
Y~ cut-off 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 
Y~ definition av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. 
restriction owners non-owners owners non-owners 
Y -0.240 -0.427 0.051 0.019 
 (0.025)*** (0.045)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Y~ 0.291 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.106)*** (0.133) (0.008) (0.006) 
HW 0.096  -0.006  
 (0.015)***  (0.001)***  
REP 0.475 0.840 0.020 -0.002 
 (0.057)*** (0.062)*** (0.017) (0.003) 
dREP -4.770 -8.405 -0.263 0.014 
 (0.656)*** (0.783)*** (0.230) (0.037) 
FW -0.004 0.010 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
dFW -0.038 0.291 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.125) (0.111)** (0.012) (0.005) 
Dt-1 -0.011 -0.001 -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
dDt-1   0.158 0.149 
   (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
kids 0.020 0.009 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.003) (0.002) 
age -0.006 -0.013 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.001)*** (0.000)** 
age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)** 
N 1,503 718 10,212 3,667 
F-stat 17 98 326 89 
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Table A3, Part 2: Owner vs non-owner split 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 
Y~ cut-off 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 99th perc 
Y~ definition av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. av. inc. 
restriction owners non-owners owners non-owners 
college -0.356 0.001 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.142)** (0.186) (0.011) (0.008) 
black 0.452 -0.116 -0.023 -0.008 
 (0.125)*** (0.169) (0.009)** (0.007) 
college#black 0.304 0.412 0.019 0.003 
 (0.172)* (0.129)*** (0.010)* (0.006) 
working 0.019 -0.084 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.045) (0.102) (0.004) (0.003) 
lowinc 0.101 -0.010 -0.017 -0.005 
 (0.038)*** (0.044) (0.004)*** (0.003) 
not married -0.037 0.005 0.014 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.043) (0.003)*** (0.002) 
turndown 0.002 0.134 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.026) (0.039)*** (0.003)** (0.002) 
dum1995 -0.028 -0.061 0.004 0.004 
 (0.028) (0.062) (0.004) (0.004) 
dum2001 -0.018 0.049 0.002 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.068) (0.003) (0.004) 
dum2004 0.005 0.113 0.005 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.060)* (0.003) (0.004) 
dum2007 -0.078 -0.036 0.009 0.001 
 (0.051) (0.075) (0.004)** (0.004) 
constant -1.887 5.152 -0.456 -0.206 
 (1.483) (2.008)** (0.115)*** (0.083)** 
N 1,503 718 10,212 3,667 
F-stat 17 98 326 89 
 
 
 
 
  
 
49 
 
Table A4, Part 1: Robustness check grouping, borrowing sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 ΔD/Y>0 
Y~ definition avtop1 avtop1 head head 
grouping edu-race region edu-race region 
Y -0.291 -0.295 -0.526 -0.454 
 (0.041)*** (0.040)*** (0.129)*** (0.105)*** 
HW0 # Y~ 0.092 -0.056 -0.655 -0.407 
 (1.150) (0.145) (0.369)* (0.311) 
HW1 # Y~ 0.109 -0.021 -0.808 -0.657 
 (1.188) (0.113) (0.345)** (0.298)** 
HW 0.088 0.084 0.076 0.077 
 (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** 
REP 0.540 0.546 0.496 0.501 
 (0.056)*** (0.056)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** 
FW 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.016 
 (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.008)* (0.008)* 
Dt-1 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
region 2 0.117 0.125 0.108 0.088 
 (0.058)* (0.064)* (0.058)* (0.061) 
region 3 0.131 0.123 0.122 0.090 
 (0.059)** (0.060)* (0.056)** (0.059) 
region 4 0.055 0.045 0.044 -0.048 
 (0.075) (0.070) (0.066) (0.080) 
region 5 0.065 0.057 0.053 0.023 
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.065) (0.068) 
region 6 0.116 0.122 0.106 0.088 
 (0.067) (0.072) (0.065) (0.065) 
region 7 0.079 0.067 0.059 -0.002 
 (0.068) (0.077) (0.066) (0.071) 
region 8 0.055 0.022 0.041 0.007 
 (0.064) (0.094) (0.062) (0.068) 
region 9 0.048 0.060 0.038 0.026 
 (0.064) (0.074) (0.061) (0.061) 
dum1995 -0.037 -0.057 -0.058 -0.055 
 (0.237) (0.046) (0.028)** (0.029)* 
constant 2.182 4.358 6.458 5.574 
 (16.317) (2.192)* (1.659)*** (1.390)*** 
N 915 914 1,007 1,007 
Dependent variable: ΔD/Y. All $ valued independent variables are subject to 
the inverse hyperbolic since transformation. Coefficients are estimated by 
OLS using probability weights. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by 
re-estimating the regression 999 times using a set of 999 replicate weights. 
Stars indicate 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. Full set of 
results including missing household characteristics can be obtained upon 
request. 
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Table A4, Part 2: Robustness check grouping, non-borrowing sample 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
sample ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 ΔD/Y≤0 
Y~ definition avtop1 avtop1 head head 
grouping edu-race region edu-race region 
Y 0.040 0.040 0.015 0.013 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
HW0 # Y~ 0.008 0.035 -0.039 -0.057 
 (0.016) (0.052) (0.017)** (0.014)*** 
HW1 # Y~ 0.011 -0.002 -0.120 -0.140 
 (0.014) (0.041) (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
HW -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
REP -0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
FW 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dt-1 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
region 2 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)* 
region 3 0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
region 4 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.025 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)** 
region 5 -0.010 -0.016 -0.018 -0.023 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)* (0.009)** 
region 6 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
region 7 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.019 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)* 
region 8 0.009 0.002 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
region 9 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
dum1995 0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
constant -0.525 -0.871 -0.118 -0.078 
 (0.241)** (0.696) (0.066)* (0.057) 
N 5,460 4,919 6,415 6,415 
Dependent variable: ΔD/Y. All $ valued independent variables are subject to the 
inverse hyperbolic since transformation. Coefficients are estimated by OLS using 
probability weights. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by re-estimating 
the regression 999 times using a set of 999 replicate weights. Stars indicate 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. Full set of results including missing 
household characteristics can be obtained upon request. 
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Table A5: Effect Size based on average income of top 1% of households within edu-race groups 
  total Y HW0#Y~ Y~ + HW REP FW D time kids 
1998  0.77% -3.26% -0.51% 5.86% 0.62% 0.67% -1.25% 0.10% 0.05% 
2001  1.10% -2.29% -0.14% 6.16% 1.12% 0.40% -3.16% 0.35% 0.05% 
2004  6.99% -8.62% 1.19% 11.21% 6.80% 1.67% -3.65% 1.39% 0.13% 
2007  2.32% -2.86% -0.33% 8.66% 3.46% 0.53% -4.65% -0.61% 0.05% 
  age college black college#black working lowinc not married turndown  
1998  -0.82% -0.64% -0.09% 0.05% -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02%  
2001  -0.96% -0.58% 0.18% -0.04% -0.03% -0.03% 0.05% 0.01%  
2004  -2.00% -1.25% 0.12% 0.08% -0.04% -0.07% 0.02% 0.01%  
2007  -1.30% -0.72% 0.08% 0.02% -0.03% -0.05% 0.05% 0.00%  
 
 
Table A6: Effect Size based on average income of top 5% of households within edu-race groups 
  total Y HW0#Y~ Y~ + HW REP FW D time kids 
1998  0.97% -1.28% -0.76% 3.72% 0.35% 0.27% -1.04% 0.36% 0.02% 
2001  0.75% -0.72% -0.64% 4.26% 0.33% 0.26% -2.29% 0.48% 0.03% 
2004  5.62% -4.08% 1.39% 6.70% 4.62% 0.83% -2.99% 0.99% 0.05% 
2007  2.02% 0.10% -0.44% 4.62% 2.43% 0.20% -3.53% -0.22% 0.02% 
  age college black college#black working lowinc not married turndown  
1998  -0.57% -0.14% -0.05% 0.07% -0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.01%  
2001  -0.83% -0.17% 0.12% -0.07% -0.03% -0.03% 0.04% 0.02%  
2004  -1.55% -0.39% 0.05% 0.10% -0.07% -0.06% 0.03% 0.00%  
2007  -0.99% -0.20% 0.05% 0.00% -0.03% -0.05% 0.06% 0.00%  
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Appendix B: Changes in outstanding liabilities 
This appendix describes how the change in outstanding liabilities was defined for the other debt 
categories used in this paper beyond the first mortgage on the primary residence which was discussed 
in section 2. These other debt categories are second and third mortgages on the primary residence, 
mortgages on other residential properties, consumer loans, car and vehicle loans, education loans, 
other loans for property purchase and home improvements. There are four categories on which the 
SCF collects information but timing information is to scarce to make accurate inferences about the 
change in the year of the interview. These categories are omitted and correspond credit card debt, 
credit lines (including home equity lines), loans against land contracts and loans against pension plans. 
This appendix is best understood after reading section 2.1 as many definitions are the same. 
Second and third mortgage on primary residence 
Information on the second (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀2) and third mortgage (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀3) is not as comprehensive as for the first 
mortgage (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀1) which is discussed in section 2. In particular whether the mortgage was refinanced or 
not is not asked for second and third mortgages and thus a different way to defining the change in the 
outstanding liability is applied. The key difference is the assumption that all second and third 
mortgages taken out in the year of the interview are new debt and are not refinanced. The definition 
of cases for second and third mortgages taken out prior to the year of the interview is equivalent to 
the categorization of the first mortgage. Cases are summarized in Table B1 which also provides the 
exact codes of the variables used. D and ΔD stand for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀2 or 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀3 and  ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀2 or ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀3 respectively. 
The reported numbers of observations refer to the second mortgage in implicate 3 of the 2004 wave.  
Table B1: Changes in the outstanding amount of the second and third mortgage on the primary residence 
case step 1 step 2 definition N interpretation 
1 tB = year 
  
 ΔD = D 25 
Assumption is that second and third 
mortgages are not refinanced but new debt.   
2.1 tB < year B > D  ΔDM = -P 64 
Household is in the process of repaying. 
2.2 tB < year B = D  ΔDM = 0 16 
No repayment yet. Interest only scheme or 
behind schedule and only able to pay interest 
rates. 
2.3 tB < year B < D  ΔDM = -P 3 
Household is behind on payments and 
interest accumulated. 
        108   
tB is defined as X902 (X1002), B corresponds to X904 (X1004), D is X905 (X1005) and P=X908-
(X916/10000*X905) and P=X1008-(X1016/10000*X1005). Terms in brackets refer to the third 
mortgage. 
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Mortgages on other residential property (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀) 
Mortgages on other residential properties refer to mortgages on vacation homes and other property 
which is used for residential purposes besides the main residency. Property which is not used for 
residential property is treated like a business asset and any liabilities on such assets are netted out 
with the current value. The SCF introduces this convention and it is also used for the purpose of this 
paper. Since information on how the money was used is not available the year of the purchase of the 
property (tp) is used as a second best option. It is assumed that mortgages taken out in the current 
year represent new debt if the property was bought in the same year, otherwise they are refinanced. 
The justification for this assumption is that one the one hand it only affects a small number of 
observations and on the other hand households with other residential properties are wealthier and 
less likely to rely on cash out refinancing out of these additional properties. Using the year of the 
purchase as additional information adds one more step to the analysis. The SCF asks about up to three 
mortgages on residential property (𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀1 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀2 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀3). All cases for all three mortgages 
of this category are summarized in Table B2. D and ΔD stand for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀2 or 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀3 and  ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀1, 
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀2 or ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀3 respectively. The number of observations refers to 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑀1  in implicate 3 in 2004. 
Table B2: Changes in the outstanding amount of mortgages on other residential property 
line step 1 step 2 step 3 definition N interpretation 
1 tB = year tp=year 
  
 ΔD = D 45 
Household used mortgage to buy 
property thus new debt.   
2 tB = year tp<year B > D  ΔD = D-B 15 
Assumption: mortgage was 
refinanced and already some 
repayment occurred. 
3 tB = year tp<year B = D  ΔD = 0 12 
Assumption: mortgage was 
refinanced but no repayment yet. 
4 tB = year tp<year B < D  ΔD = D-B 0 
Irrelevant. No observations fall into 
this case in any year. 
5.1 tB <year  B > D  ΔD = -P 206 
Households paying back. 
5.2 tB < year  B = D  ΔD = 0 35 
Not paying back yet (due to interest 
only period). 
5.3 tB < year  B < D  ΔD = -P 2 
Household behind on schedule and 
interest rate accumulates. 
          315   
tp indicates year property was bougth. tB is defined as X1713 (X1813/X1913), B corresponds to 
X1714 (X1814/X1914), D is X1715 (X1815/X1915) and P=X1718-(X1726/10000*X1715). All stocks 
and payments are multiplied by the ownership share (X1705/X1805/X1905). Terms in brackets refer 
to the second and third residential property beyond the main residence. 
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Cases 1 and 5.1 to 5.3 are identical to the definitions for second and third mortgages on the primary 
residence. Cases 2 to 3 are different in that the payment is not inferred from the reported payments 
and interest rates of the household but rather by the difference between the amount initially 
borrowed and currently outstanding. The reason is that it is easier to remember outstanding amounts 
and the amount initially borrowed compared to changing interest rates and payments. Accordingly if 
the amount initially borrowed is different from the amount currently outstanding the difference is 
defined as principal repayment. In case the current amount exceeds the amount initially borrowed 
(case 4), this would indicate that the household fell behind in payments within the first year of the 
mortgage. In 2004 not a single observation fell into this unlikely case. 
Consumer loans 
The SCF collects information about up to six unsecured consumer loans 25 . The change in the 
outstanding amount is derived identically to the cases of second and third mortgages. The reason is 
that for consumer loans are usually not refinanced. Also the way the SCF asks about them in the 
interview does not allow for the possibility of refinancing (`How much was borrowed or financed, not 
counting the finance charges?’)26. So the assumption that consumer loans taken out in the year of the 
interview represent new debt seems uncontroversial. The definitions are summarized in Table B3, the 
number of observations corresponds to the third implicate in the 2004 wave. 
Table B3: Changes in the outstanding amount of unsecured consumer loans 
case step 1 step 2 definition N interpretation 
1 tB = year 
  
 ΔD = D 110 
Taking on new debt. 
  
2.1 tB <year B > D  ΔD = -P 160 
Paying back an existing consumer 
loan. 
2.2 tB < year B = D  ΔD = 0 32 
Interest only period or household 
struggles with payments. 
2.3 tB < year B < D  ΔD = -P 6 
Households behind schedule and 
interest accumulated. 
        308   
tB is defined as X2713, B corresponds to X2714, D is X2723 and P=X2718-(X2724/10000*X2723). If 
X2724 is not observed X2719 is used, both expressions are transformed to annual frequencies. tB 
for the next five consumer loans corresponds to X2730/X2813/X2830/X2913/X2930, B for the next 
five corresponds to X2731/X2814 etc. 
 
                                                          
25 Consumer loans are based on item X2730 as long as the loan was not taken out for investment purposes in 
non-residential real estate (X2710==78). 
26 Refers to item X2714 in the SCF codebook. 
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Car and vehicle loans 
Loans to purchase cars and other vehicles are categorized identical to consumer loans. Debt taken on 
in the current period is assumed to be new debt. Definitions and number of observations for each case 
in the 2004 wave (implicate 3) are displayed in Table B4.  
Table B4: Changes in the outstanding amount of car and vehicle loans 
case step 1 step 2 definition N interpretation 
1 tB = year    ΔD = D 284 
Taking out a car loan in the current 
year thus new debt. 
2.1 tB <year B > D  ΔD = -P 932 Paying back an earlier car loan. 
2.2 tB < year B = D  ΔD = 0 3 Not paying on the loan. 
2.3 tB < year B < D  ΔD = -P 0 
Accumulating interest failed to pay. 
        1219   
tB is defined as X2208, B corresponds to X2209, D is X2218 and P=X2213-(X2219/10000*X2209). If 
X2213 is not observed X7537 is used, both expressions are transformed to annual frequencies. tB 
for the next five car loans corresponds to X2308/X2408/X2509/X2609/X7157, B for the next five 
corresponds to X2309/X2409 etc. 
 
Education loans 
The SCF collects information about up to six education or student loans. While the changes in the 
outstanding amount are defined in the same way as for car and consumer loans, the number of 
observations in each case in 2004 (implicate 3) demonstrates the different way in which student loans 
are paid back. In most student loans principal as well as interest payments only start after graduation. 
This applies to federal as well as private student loans. Federal student loans come in subsidized and 
unsubsidized form. Federal student loans normally have lower interest rates than private ones and in 
addition, interest payments are paid for by the government in the case of subsidized loans. Thus except 
in the case of subsidized student loans, it is the normal situation after graduation that students face 
an outstanding amount which exceeds the amount initially borrowed due to accumulated interest. This 
is reflected by the high number of observations falling into case 2.3 compared to consumer or car 
loans. For student loans it is also much more common to observe that the outstanding amount equals 
the amount initially borrowed even if borrowing occurred in some year prior to the interview. The 
reason is that interest on subsidized federal student loans does not accumulate but is paid for by the 
government. 
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Table B5: Changes in the outstanding amount of education loans 
case step 1 step 2 definition N interpretation  
1 tB = year 
  
 ΔD = D 53 
Students taking out a student loan in the 
current year thus new debt.   
2.1 tB < year B > D  ΔD = -P 254 
Student not enrolled anymore and paying 
back the loan. 
2.2 tB < year B = D  ΔD = 0 125 
Still enrolled, no accumulation of interest 
rates and not started to pay back. 
2.3 tB < year B < D  ΔD = -P 60 
Non subsidized or private loan, interest 
accumulated, now in process of repaying. 
        492   
tB is defined as X7804, B corresponds to X7805, D is X7824 and P=X7815-(X7822/10000*X7824). If 
X7815 is not observed X7817 is used, both expressions are transformed to annual frequencies. tB 
for the next five education loans corresponds to X7827/X7850/X7904/X7927/X7950. 
 
Other loans 
Other loans represent loans taken out to buy the primary residence or to undertake home 
improvements. They are categorized as `other´ because they are not owed to a bank or a financial 
institution but to relatives or to the seller of the property. Thus they refer to loans which are part of 
rather informal arrangements. In 2004 (implicate 3) a very limited number of households reported 
such liabilities and their importance for the aggregate picture is marginal. 
Table B6: Changes in the outstanding amount of other loans 
case step 1 step 2 definition N interpretation  
1 tB = year    ΔD = D 5 Taking out new debt. 
2.1 tB <year B > D  ΔD = -P 16 In the process of repaying. 
2.2 tB < year B = D  ΔD = 0 10 No repayments yet. 
2.3 tB < year B < D  ΔD = -P 0 Irrelevant. 
        31   
tB is defined as X1034, B corresponds to X1035, D is X1044 and P=X1039-(X1045/10000*X1044). If 
X1039 is not observed X1040 is used, both expressions are transformed to annual frequencies. tB 
for home improvement loans is X1205. 
 
